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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay defends a seemingly implausible thesis: that judges
sometimes promote interests that freedom of speech advances when they
decide not to invalidate legislation that limits free speech. This thesis
assumes a certain relationship between free speech and democratic gov-
ernment, one that informs Felix Frankfurter's defense of judicial
restraint. While people are quick to cite Frankfurter to support the idea
* Instructor, Columbia University. B.A., Drew University, 1985; J.D., Yale University,
1988; Ph.D., Columbia University, 1998. I would like to thank Robert Amdur, Kent Greenawalt,
Louis Henkin, Eric Mitchko, and Steven Wall for helpful comments.
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that judges should defer to political authority' or to claim that judicial
restraint endangers important interests,2 they do not adequately explore
the basis of his reservations about judicial authority. Frankfurter's con-
ception of free speech in a democracy explains his restraint when con-
fronted by legislation-such as in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis,3 West Virginia v. Barnette,4 and Dennis v. United States5-that
advances interests at odds with his presuppositions concerning good
government.6 His opinions in these cases suggest a sophisticated argu-
ment about the place of constitutional rights in a democracy.
The relationship between rights and democracy must influence
one's thinking about political legitimacy. Most people assume that
legitimate governments are democratic and must respect rights-such as
guarantees of free speech-that protect citizens' vital interests. People
disagree about the extent of these rights and the best way to guarantee
their inviolability.7 Frankfurter's defense of judicial restraint suggests a
symbiotic relationship between rights and democracy that has implica-
tions for determining the best means to secure rights and to promote
legitimate democratic government. According to Frankfurter, a healthy
democracy must guarantee certain rights.8 Frankfurter emphasizes,
however, that legitimate governments gain strength as citizens learn to
respect rights. When citizens participate in democratic government,
they develop a character-virtues, such as courage, tolerance, empathy,
liberality, and open-mindedness-that enables them to respect rights.
This essay uses the term liberal character to describe people who pos-
sess these virtues. The term is intended to reflect the readiness with
which people who possess this character depend on their reason to
assess the challenge posed by unusual and unfamiliar ideas.9
1. See, e.g., Steven S. Neff, The United States Military vs. The Media: Constitutional
Friction, 46 MERCER L. REV. 977, 999 (1995).
2. See, e.g., H.N. HIRSCH, A THEORY OF LIBERTY 4 (1992); ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 81, 172-74 (1990); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION 124 (1993); Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred
Position of Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 CONST.
CoM. 277, 293 (1995); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in
Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1464 (1990).
3. 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (holding that forcing school children to salute the flag does not
violate the First Amendment).
4. 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter dissenting to the Court's decision to overrule
Gobitis).
5. 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter concurring in affirmance of the lower court
judgment upholding the constitutionality of the Smith Act of 1940).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
7. Obviously, there are great disputes about the substance of these rights.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 57-59.
9. I will claim that this type of character informs the arguments of both Brandeis and
Frankfurter. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44, 60-81.
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Resuscitating Frankfurter is not the primary concern of this essay;
rather, it focuses on whether Frankfurter's conception of democracy has
implications for how judges should approach contemporary issues of
free speech. In particular, it argues that controversies involving flag-
burning and hate speech expose differences in how citizens value free
speech. Some people consider guarantees of free speech as means for
promoting important interests that must be secured by a legitimate gov-
ernment. Others recognize how free speech contributes to the develop-
ment of their character. They believe that by endorsing these
guarantees, citizens express the value of a liberal character.
It is easy to mistake people's passion for free speech bred from a
concern for individual ends' ° for an affirmation of the value of a liberal
character. Consequently, it is easy to overestimate the quality of peo-
ple's character and their commitment to free speech. Moreover, Frank-
furter does not specify how political participation induces a change in
citizens' character. This essay argues that controversies involving flag-
burning and hate speech provide opportunities to test Frankfurter's con-
ception of democracy. By looking at these controversies, one can deter-
mine whether the Court might have strengthened citizens' characters and
their commitment to free speech, if it had refused to invalidate legisla-
tion that restricted speech.
Part II of this essay examines different arguments claiming that free
speech is a precondition for legitimate democratic government, and how
Louis Brandeis applies these arguments in Whitney v. California. 1 Part
III interprets Frankfurter's opinion in Dennis to be an extension of Bran-
deis' opinion. Frankfurter acknowledges the importance of free speech
in a democracy, and contends that citizens who participate in democratic
politics are more likely to develop the type of character that is the foun-
dation for Brandeis' arguments. Thus, Frankfurter concludes that judi-
cial restraint helps citizens to develop this character. Part IV illustrates
how the power of Brandeis' rhetoric leads people to conflate his differ-
ent arguments linking guarantees of free speech to legitimate democratic
government. Finally, Part V examines whether Frankfurter's defense of
judicial restraint should be applied to contemporary free speech conflicts
that involve flag-burning and hate speech. These conflicts reveal peo-
ple's tendency to exaggerate citizens' commitment to free speech, but
also suggest that judicial restraint might encourage political participation
that will strengthen their commitment.
10. I refer to these ends as particular interests. See infra text accompanying note 22.
11. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis concurring in the Court's decision upholding a
conviction under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act of 1919).
1998]
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II. FREE SPEECH AND LEGITIMATE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
A. Formulations of Free Speech Principles
Before proceeding, it will be helpful to distinguish different claims
people make about the relationship between political legitimacy and
rights that guarantee free speech. The first claim assumes that guaran-
tees of free speech are a condition of political legitimacy, because they
ensure that the government treats citizens with the respect that human
beings deserve.
A second claim conditions political legitimacy on benefits citizens
receive when the government guarantees free speech. It contends that
these benefits compensate for any coercion suffered through the exercise
of governmental authority. 2 Guarantees of free speech allow citizens to
accept political authority. They ensure that citizens have a tighter rein
on their representatives, and they contribute to a political environment
that enhances citizens' deliberations about particular interests.
A third claim bases legitimacy on citizens' desire to strengthen
their character, a desire that citizens express when they endorse princi-
ples of free speech. A government whose citizens affirm a liberal char-
acter has a stronger claim of legitimacy. This conception of free speech
encompasses a more concrete-but still fairly abstract-assertion: Guar-
antees of free speech reveal that citizens recognize that a liberal charac-
ter has value independent of its contribution to individual and collective
interests.
The first and second claims derive governmental legitimacy from
the government's treatment of its citizens, while the third derives it from
evidence of citizens' attitudes about free speech. The first two claims
overlap with the third. How the government treats its citizens will influ-
ence how those citizens think about free speech. In addition, one would
challenge the legitimacy of a government whose treatment of its citizens
fell below the threshold of respect that is due people, even if its citizens
remained committed to free speech or to the government itself. The dis-
tinction also helps to avoid mistakes made by commentators who con-
flate the argument that appeals to citizens' character as evidence of
governmental legitimacy with the argument that the government is legit-
imate because it helps citizens to attain such a character.
Moreover, this essay will argue that most citizens lack a liberal
12. Together these claims define the collective interest-citizens' interest in enforcing
collective values-that I will discuss infra: (1) Free speech contributes to citizens' interest in
enforcing community values by ensuring that these values express the will of each individual, and
thus, ensuring that citizens receive the treatment that they are due; or (2) Free speech leads to
better government policies, and thus, each citizen benefits even if they occasionally disagree with
a policy.
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character and do not view guarantees of free speech as means for
strengthening their character. This indicates that citizens will not readily
accede to the exercise of judicial review when it impedes their pursuit of
individual interests. Contemporary free speech controversies involving
flag-burning and hate speech illustrate the limits of citizens' character.
In situations such as these, judges should refuse to invalidate illiberal
legislation. Judicial restraint would encourage political responses to
such legislation, and thereby promote democratic participation that
would teach citizens to value free speech and a liberal character. This
argument is not a claim of the first or second type, but it is contingent on
such claims. We will see that free speech principles guarantee interests
that judges must secure before they seek to strengthen citizens'
character.
It is also important to distinguish claims people make about free
speech principles when they evaluate judicial action. People expect
judges to decide free speech cases based on interpretations of these prin-
ciples, and therefore, appeal to these principles to support criticisms of
judicial decisions; they criticize judges who stray from these principles
without sufficient warrant-from a superseding principle or from cir-
cumstances unique to the context in which the case arises-or who mis-
interpret them. More generally, people expect that judges will base their
actions on principle and not on individual interests.13 For example, crit-
ics may disagree with how a judge applies a free speech principle or
with a judge's decision to rely on a superseding principle, and still
believe that the judge acted in a principled manner. They would need
additional evidence to support the contrary contention.
We must distinguish claims that link free speech principles to gov-
ernmental legitimacy from those that use free speech principles to assess
judicial action. It conflates two paths of analysis when people confuse a
criticism of judicial action with a judgment that a government is illegiti-
mate. We have already seen that the claim, that free speech principles
root political legitimacy in citizens' affirmation of the value of a liberal
character, is independent of claims about governmental actions.
Although government actions will obviously affect citizens' sentiments
about free speech and a liberal character, 14 these actions do not necessar-
ily determine people's sentiments.
Given that some people consider the benefits secured when judges
enforce free speech principles a foundation of political legitimacy, how-
13. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959).
14. My thesis depends on this fact. I argue that judges can promote conditions likely to
strengthen citizens' character.
19981
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ever, it would appear that a judge who misinterprets free speech princi-
ples would undermine a government's claim of legitimacy. A litigant
who loses a case-and is denied such benefits-because a judge misap-
plied applicable free speech principles could support a claim that the
government's action was coercive, and possibly the abstract claim that
the action is illegitimate. Nonetheless, although an ideal government
would never violate rights that are conditions of its legitimacy, experi-
ence teaches us to reduce our expectations; governments are not ideal.
People will lose cases that they should win. When judges-or any gov-
ernmental officer-upset interests that condition governmental legiti-
macy, people have a basis to criticize their action and, assuming that
their error is not an isolated occurrence, a reason to remove them from
office. However, this analysis is only peripherally related to questions
of political legitimacy. We assess the legitimacy of government to
determine its general operation: how well a system of governmental
institutions respects interests that we believe must be guaranteed by a
legitimate government.' 5 Thus, although we remain concerned about
competent judging, our focus on legitimacy makes us more concerned
about whether the government has mechanisms to correct judicial errors
and prevent their reoccurrence.
B. Collective and Particular Interests Advanced by Free Speech
The ideas that free speech advances the search for truth and, less
ambitiously, the quest for successful democratic government are basic
tenets of American democracy. They have roots in the writings of John
Milton' 6 and John Stuart Mill,' 7 and enter Supreme Court jurisprudence
when Justice Holmes employs the market place of ideas metaphor in his
dissent to Abrams v. New York. 8 Alexander Meiklejohn develops this
metaphor in his treatise on free speech,' 9 and it becomes orthodoxy in
15. Thus, although we remain concerned about competent judging, our focus on legitimacy
makes us more concerned about whether the government has mechanisms to correct judicial errors
and prevent their reoccurrence.
16. See generally JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (Bandanna, 1991).
17. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978).
18. 250 U.S. 616:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
Id. at 630-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1st ed. 1948).
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New York Times v. Sullivan.20
Few would deny that democracy fails without some guarantees of
free speech. But, people disagree about why protecting free speech is a
condition of legitimate democratic government. To settle this disagree-
ment, it must be determined how limits on political discussion corrupt
democratic ends.
People can agree that legislatures perform better than they other-
wise would, if citizens and representatives are free to discuss issues and
these discussions yield factual information and normative argument that
shapes legislation. Restrictions on speech often limit the scope and
resources of political discussion and, consequently, throttle effective
democracy. 21 Free speech creates an environment that facilitates citi-
zens' deliberations about collective and particular interests; it leads citi-
zens to make better choices about these interests. This essay uses the
term collective interests to refer to interests shared by most members of
the political community. Particular interests refer to any interest a citi-
zen might wish to pursue.2
Free speech allows citizens and their representatives to resolve con-
flicts among competing ideas. Moreover, it allows citizens to control
their representatives. When elected officials control the information
made available to the public, they have leeway to pursue their own inter-
ests to the detriment of democratic ends. Free speech checks govern-
mental power:23  It ensures that representatives direct their energy
toward advancing the public good rather than particular interests. It also
forces representatives to consider their constituents' particular interests
as well as their own.
Thus, free speech is a precondition for legitimate democratic gov-
ernment. It advances a collective interest in promoting good legislation.
Representatives will perform better if they must strive to satisfy the
expectations of informed constituents. Free speech also advances peo-
ple's particular interests: (1) it limits government's ability to manipulate
citizens' judgments about particular interests; (2) it increases the likeli-
hood that citizens will make better choices about their particular inter-
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (upholding the right to publish libelous statements about public
officials).
21. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 19; Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. REv. 1 (1971).
22. I will argue that political legitimacy depends on respect for certain particular interests or
providing benefits-such as those that arise from guarantees of free speech-that advance
citizens' particular interests. Moreover, these benefits can themselves be considered particular
interests. Therefore, citizens' interest in the environment in which they define and pursue
particular interests is itself a particular interest.
23. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, WEAVER CONST. L.
SERiES no. 3 (1977).
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ests; and (3) it helps citizens combat legislation that impedes their
pursuit of these interests.
Arguments that defend speech based on citizens' interest in pro-
moting good legislation tend to protect less speech than those based on
citizens' interest in advancing individual ends. People who emphasize
this interest in good legislation link political legitimacy to authoritative
norms that they assume will be identified by a well-ordered political
process.24 This essay refers to these norms as community values to indi-
cate their special status. Community values are not simply norms that a
majority or super-majority of the community endorse at a given point in
time. The term community values connotes a stronger meaning: that
government institutions derive authority when they enforce these norms.
Community values gain their authority from the process that identi-
fies them. Government institutions will define good values if there is
open discussion, or if such discussion encourages citizens to reach con-
sensus about the public good so that legislation will then express a com-
mon will. These arguments suggest that people should measure political
discourse against an ideal, and that they can use this ideal to justify
limitations on speech. For example, limitations would be justified if
they improved the quality of political discourse." In addition, an ideal
of political discourse allows people to compare different species of
speech. They can deem speech that does not enhance political delibera-
tion less valuable, and thereby, expose it to regulation.26
Rather than assume that a well-ordered political process identifies
community values that rational citizens can acknowledge as consistent
with the common good or as an expression of a common will, other
theorists claim that political institutions derive authority when they rep-
resent citizens' particular interests. Guarantees of free speech facilitate
citizens' deliberations about particular interests.2 7 Theorists who defend
broad guarantees of free speech claim that wide-ranging and uninhibited
speech ensures that citizens have adequate information to determine
24. See, e.g., CASS. R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH XVi-XVii,
241-43 (1993); Bork, supra note 21, at 26.
25. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405
(1986); SUNSTEIN, supra note 24; J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375.
26. This idea supports the Supreme Court's categorical approach to free speech that deems
certain categories of speech-such as libel, fighting words, and obscenity-without value and
therefore subject to regulation. Robert Bork interprets the First Amendment as extending
protection only to political speech. See Bork, supra note 21, at 20. He defends significant
restrictions on free speech by establishing that certain types of expression are outside the range of
speech necessary for adequate political deliberation.
27. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 17, at 31-33, 53-55.
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their choice of particular interests and the means for pursuing them. 8
Furthermore, guarantees of free speech ensure that once citizens have
adequate information with which to make their choices, the government
does not interfere in the process of selection.2 9 Thus, these theorists
provide two bases for the claim that citizens' deliberations are advanced
by free speech: (1) citizens will make more informed choices if they
receive increased information; and (2) citizens are in a better position
than the government to gauge how this information affects their inter-
ests, and thus, their choices may be considered autonomous.3 ° On the
other hand, to defend limitations on free speech these theorists must
demonstrate that regulation will improve the environment in which citi-
zens choose and pursue their ends. For example, a regulation that limits
the hours of sports programming on television would seem to interfere
with citizens' choice of amusement. People could justify such legisla-
tion, however, if they thought that the regulation would lead citizens to
make better viewing choices.3' Many theorists recognize the merits of
both types of claims: Free speech promotes the identification of commu-
nity values, and it provides citizens an appropriate sanctuary 32 in which
to define and pursue their particular interests. Clearly, people should
challenge the legitimacy of a government that restricts speech which
would advance legislative decision-making or citizens' abilities to define
and pursue particular interests. But this essay does not seek to adjudi-
cate conflicts between the arguments linking free speech to legitimate
government, or to establish the scope of free speech necessary to ensure
political legitimacy; it is not concerned with restrictions on speech that
could render a government illegitimate. Instead, it explores a third con-
nection between free speech and legitimate democratic government. A
legitimate government strengthens its authority when it develops citi-
28. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 17, at 31-33, 53-55; Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, I PHIL. & PUB. AFi. 204 (1972); David A. Strauss, Persuasion Autonomy and
Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 334 (1991).
29. See id.
30. We have also seen that guarantees of free speech limit the government's ability to
interfere with citizens' pursuit of these interests. In addition, there is a tension between these
bases for the claim that free speech advances citizens' deliberations. It is possible that by ensuring
that citizens make their own choices, certain choices they make will be worse than a choice that
could be imposed on them by the government.
31. See also T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 519 (1979).
32. I use the term appropriate sanctuary to capture the different aspects of claims about
individual interests. Although people disagree about the extent that government can interfere with
people's choices in order to enhance the likelihood that they will make better choices, every
theorist who defends free speech based on particular interests would believe that there remains
some space in which the government cannot interfere with citizens' choice of particular interests.
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zens who endorse guarantees of free speech, in order to manifest and
affirm the value of a liberal character.
This claim about free speech is closely related to-and therefore
easily confused with-the claims that free speech contributes to collec-
tive and particular interests. The earlier claims emphasize how free
speech contributes to citizens' interests by leading people-individually
and collectively-to make better choices, or by limiting the govern-
ment's ability to interfere with citizens' choice and pursuit of particular
interests. In contrast, the third claim links free speech to citizens' con-
cern for their character. Because this claim examines political legiti-
macy in light of citizens' sentiments, it invites a different form of
analysis than the other claims. A primary concern is whether citizens
have the requisite attitude toward free speech and a liberal character, not
whether the government maintains conditions that establish its
legitimacy.33
This essay argues that many citizens lack this attitude, and that
commentators are slow to recognize this deficiency, because they con-
flate a claim of the third type with claims of the first two types. Further-
more, it argues that judges can strengthen people's character and their
commitment to free speech by encouraging political responses to illib-
eral legislation, and that these benefits outweigh the slight harms to col-
lective and particular interests inflicted by such legislation. Citizens
tend to become more involved in political controversies than they do in
legal controversies.34 Political participation shapes citizens' character
and leads them to recognize how guarantees of free speech contribute to
the development of their character. Therefore, in certain contexts, peo-
ple should rely on democratic participation-rather than judicial
review-to challenge legislation that would offend liberal citizens.
The issue of political legitimacy, however, becomes confused,
because people expect that liberal citizens will make better choices
about collective and particular interests. Because it is contended that
judges should tolerate illiberal legislation in order to encourage citizens
33. Although this essay focuses on the connection between liberal virtues and citizens'
commitment to free speech, it also assumes the validity of the earlier claims about free speech and
democratic legitimacy; a legitimate government must guarantee free speech in order to promote
citizens' particular and collective interests. I do not intend to establish the scope of these
guarantees, but when I argue that judges should tolerate restrictions on free speech I indicate why
I do not believe that these interests are implicated by the restrictions anticipated.
34. There are obvious counter examples. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is a recent and
notable one. Nonetheless, the case can be made that the legal fight generated by Roe has impeded
public discussion of the issue. It has caused people to focus on whether they have won the legal
battle over abortion rather than on how to find common ground on the issue. A political fight
might have given participants an incentive to find such ground. See also MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTs TALK 58-60 (1991).
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to develop a liberal character, it is easy to confuse this contention with
claims made by those who argue that certain restrictions on speech could
promote citizens' deliberations about collective and particular interests.
These people claim that limitations of speech advance free speech prin-
ciples. This essay's concern, in contrast, is whether judges should toler-
ate certain violations of free speech principles-in the short run-in
order to promote a political environment that teaches citizens to recog-
nize how guarantees of free speech contribute to the development of
their character. These violations must be consistent with the assumption
that guarantees of free speech secure interests protected by a legitimate
government. Thus, this essay argues that the reasons for guaranteeing
free speech extend to interests beyond those that condition political
legitimacy .
C. Free Speech and the Development of a Liberal Character
In his concurring opinion in Whitney, Justice Brandeis examines the
relationship between free speech and legitimate democratic government.
Brandeis assumes that free speech enables political institutions to iden-
tify community values and advances each citizen's deliberations about
particular interests, but he also deepens the connection between free
speech and legitimate democratic government. He suggests that free
speech can serve as a foundation for political authority, because citizens
recognize that free speech is integral to their liberal character. In order
to grasp this argument, one must see how Brandeis' claims about citi-
zens' character informs different connections he draws between free
speech and legitimate democratic government.
Brandeis believes that a successful political community nurtures
virtuous citizens-the virtue that he emphasizes is courage-who can
overcome the irrational fears that inspire censorship. Free speech is a
precondition for democratic government because it teaches citizens to
confront-with arguments-unfamiliar ideas that inspire these fears,
and trust their use of reason to combat bad or dangerous proposals.36
Courageous citizens will enjoy substantial benefits. They will
remain open-minded when confronted by unfamiliar ideas, and will
work to escape the biases that flow from their own position and to better
understand the positions of others. They will moderate any claims
founded on their beliefs, at least that which is necessary to secure a
35. For example, one might endorse Lee Bollinger's argument that guarantees of free speech
promote tolerance without believing that the promotion of tolerance is a condition of legitimate
government. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 237-48 (1986).
36. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). "Fear of serious injury cannot
alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It
is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears." Id.
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critical perspective from which to evaluate the truths they affirm. Cou-
rageous citizens will strive to be empathetic, which will lead them to
make better choices about community values and particular interests.
Brandeis' analysis suggests three different connections between
free speech and legitimate democratic government. Two of these con-
nections extend our earlier discussion of how free speech promotes col-
lective and particular interests that are conditions of legitimate
democratic government. Because people make better choices after they
tame irrational fears that warp their thinking, one would expect that citi-
zens who escape the tyranny of irrational fears are more likely to iden-
tify community values. When citizens recognize common interests, they
can overcome distrust of others that prevents the identification of com-
munity values. Brandeis makes this point when he contends that "free-
dom to think what you will and to speak what you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.
'37
Furthermore, free speech promotes individual ends because courage
advances each citizen's deliberations about competing particular inter-
ests. Empathy renders citizens more willing-and able-to exploit a
diverse environment. As citizens learn to adjust their preferences to
respect the perspectives of others, they also grow to appreciate those
perspectives and are more likely to give them serious consideration.38
For example, Frank Michelman discusses the impact of the civil rights
movement on the American political conscience. 39 He claims that peo-
ple experience this impact individually and collectively. It is easy to see
that Michelman's claim has wider applicability; political toleration has
led to greater acceptance and appreciation of African-American culture.
African-American culture has increasingly become an important compo-
nent of the wider culture; it shapes people's understanding of art, music,
literature, and many other pursuits. While the McCarthy hearings pro-
vide an eloquent reminder of Brandeis' warning concerning the bondage
wrought by irrational fears-and the danger of witch trials 4 0-the same
era also teaches that men fear music by African-American artists and
buy Pat Boone records.4'
37. Id. at 375.
38. See Frank I. Michelnan, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 29 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1555, 1567, 1570 (1988).
39. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1530 (1988).
40. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
41. Pat Boone's fame is at least partly attributable to his recordings of songs that were
originally performed by African-American artists but denied radio exposure. Although no official
censorship banned access to African-American artists, the sale of their records was limited by a
form of censorship within the society. Record companies and radio stations did not market these
artists for a wider audience, and the mores and customs in many parts of the country provided
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Brandeis also draws a third connection between free speech and
democratic legitimacy. Brandeis contends that guarantees of free speech
manifest citizens' courageous character. They reveal that people have
confidence in their rational faculties. Citizens trust that free speech will
enable the political community to identify and shield itself from danger-
ous ideas. They have confidence in the political institutions-including
free speech-that underwrite their courage. Brandeis introduces the
founding generation as a paragon of courage, to appeal to citizens' con-
fidence that reason exercised through democratic government can com-
bat dangerous ideas.
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards.
They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the
cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in
the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the process
of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be
deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of evil apprehended is
so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full
discussion.42
The first two connections Brandeis draws between free speech and legit-
imate democratic government focus on the benefits people derive from
free speech; free speech leads citizens to identify community values and
to make better choices about particular interests.43 In contrast, Brandeis'
appeal to the founding generation is effective to the extent that people
believe that being courageous has value independent of its contribution
to other ends. People should aspire to be like the founding generation
because of its character; the founding generation was "courageous, and
self-reliant ... [and had]... confidence in the power of free and fearless
reasoning applied through the process of popular government. . .. "I'
Brandeis does not contend that citizens actually seek to develop a
liberal character, and there is evidence to challenge such an argument.
Nonetheless, Brandeis' appeal to emulate the founding generation sug-
gests that he believes political legitimacy is connected to citizens' devel-
opment of a liberal character. By appealing to the character of the
founding generation, Brandeis indicates that people should relish a lib-
eral character, and thus, a government would strengthen its claim of
foundation for this market strategy. In addition, widespread prejudice against African-Americans
must have influenced many people's response to artists of each race. One would expect that even
when given the opportunity to listen to Little Richard's version of Good Golly Miss Molly along
side Pat Boone's remake, the prejudices of some of Pat Boone's fans would taint their response to
the music. Rock and Roll's reputation for exciting the sex drive of teenagers is at least partly
associated with its association as race music.
42. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
44. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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legitimacy if it developed such citizens. Consequently, Brandeis
defends free speech because it contributes to a political process that
encourages citizens to affirm the value of a liberal character.
John Stuart Mill makes a similar claim about the connection
between individual and collective well-being. He celebrates rare
ages-such as classical Greece, the Renaissance, and enlightenment
Germany-in which there is a symbiotic relationship between individual
and societal greatness. He contrasts conformity in Victorian England,
which he believes breeds mediocrity by extinguishing individuality:
Where not the person's own character but the traditions or customs of
other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the prin-
cipal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient
of individual and social progress. 5
Mill believes individual and social progress become entwined. People
contribute to the evolution of their society, which in turn fuels their own
development:
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in
themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits
imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings
become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the
works partake the character of those who do them, by the same pro-
cess human life becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing
more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and
strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by
making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to
the development of his individuality, each person becomes more val-
uable to himself, and is therefore, capable of being more valuable to
others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and
when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is
composed of them.46
While Mill speaks broadly of the relationship between individual
achievement and the greatness of human-kind, he suggests that individ-
ual autonomy47 becomes valuable in its own right. People flourish when
they draw forth their individuality and make choices about their lives in
an environment conducive to deliberation. Furthermore, the process of
human development feeds itself as the life each person defines becomes
a model for others. Thus, self-definition becomes an on-going process
45. MILL, supra note 17, at 54.
46. Id. at 60.
47. Mill, who focuses on autonomy, in contrast to Brandeis' concern for citizens'
development of virtues that will lead them to make better choices about their lives, concentrates
on a different aspect of people's character. But, the broader point is the same: People consider
themselves bound to a social context that contributes to their formation of a favorable character.
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that binds people to the social context that supports and manifests
human achievement.
We must not be precipitous, however, in concluding that guarantees
of free speech are integral to a political process that advances the devel-
opment of citizens' character. Mill's immediate concern was the atti-
tudes of Victorian society; he was less concerned with the institutions of
the political community.48 According to Mill, people do not become
autonomous through political association, but through engagements with
human-kind. If political association is peripheral to the development of
citizens' character, it would not lead citizens to consider the enforce-
ment of guarantees of free speech an affirmation of the value of a liberal
character.49
III. LIBERAL VIRTUES AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:
FRANKFURTER'S RESPONSE TO BRANDEIS
Felix Frankfurter draws a closer connection between political asso-
ciation and the development of liberal citizens. But unlike Brandeis, he
emphasizes that citizens develop their character when they participate in
democratic politics. Therefore, although a liberal person would value
free speech, free speech gains its value because it is a precondition for
the operation of democratic politics. Frankfurter tolerates limits on free
speech that do not impede democracy.50
Frankfurter contends that through democratic participation, people
attain the liberal character described by Brandeis' ideal of civic courage.
His opinion in Dennis acts as a counterpoise to Brandeis' argument in
Whitney. He concurs in the Court's judgment upholding the constitu-
tionality of a provision of the Smith Act of 1940, which made it a felony
to advocate the violent overthrow of the United States government or to
conspire to organize a group that advocates such violence.5 1 Frankfurter
upholds the limitations on free speech, but still embraces the virtues that
Brandeis believes are instilled and manifest by guarantees of free
speech. More significantly, he questions whether citizens attain these
virtues when the Court invalidates legislation that limits free speech.
Frankfurter suggests that if citizens are forced to challenge legislation
through the democratic process, they will develop the virtues that Bran-
deis rhapsodizes.
48. See MILL, supra note 17, at 3-8.
49. Mill believes that people should endorse free speech to secure the benefits of social
interactions, and that they have an obligation to respect political institutions from which they
derive benefits. See MILL, supra note 17, at 73.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 57-59.
51. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951).
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On the surface, Frankfurter's opinion fails to treat free speech seri-
ously. He believes that free speech derives its value from its role in a
democracy, but leaves it to the legislature to balance "[t]he demands of
free speech in a democratic society" and "the interest in national secur-
ity."'5 2 Frankfurter contends that the balance between free speech and
security touches on broader political questions, and the Court's involve-
ment with the issue might bring its independence into question.53 The
Court lacks the competence to resolve such issues, and therefore, should
respect the legislature's judgment.54 Frankfurter concludes that Con-
gress made a reasonable judgment concerning the best way to combat
communism. 55
Because Frankfurter allows the legislature to determine the role of
free speech in a democracy, he seems to contradict the conclusion that
guarantees of free speech are a precondition for legitimate democratic
government. However, Frankfurter can defend this position by distin-
guishing among the different claims about the relationship between free
speech and legitimate democratic government. While the legislation in
question is illiberal, it does not necessarily restrict speech that a legiti-
mate government must protect. The Smith Act restricted speech that
sought to circumvent and destroy democratic institutions. 6 It did not
limit speech that helped people control their elected representatives or
that significantly contributed to their deliberations about collective or
particular interests. People still could pursue communist ends through
democratic means, and the debate about the merits of communism might
even enhance citizens' deliberations about their ends.
Although the Smith Act did not necessarily undermine legitimate
democratic government, Frankfurter's opinion allows the government
too much leeway to regulate speech that democratic governments must
protect. Nonetheless, Frankfurter recognizes that a legitimate govern-
ment must guarantee certain rights. Frankfurter's faith in democracy57
did not prevent him from finding unreasonable legislative or administra-
tive actions that denied rights that he believed to be a foundation for
52. Id. at 524 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
53. See id. at 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
54. Justice Frankfurter remarked that: "History teaches that the independence of the judiciary
is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary
responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures." Id. at
525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He continues: "To make validity of legislation depend on
judicial reading of events still in the womb of time ...is to charge the judiciary with duties
beyond its equipment." Id. at 551 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
55. See id. at 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
56. See id. at 551 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
57. See generally Sanford Levinson, The Democratic Faith of Felix Frankfurter, 25 STAN. L.
REv. 430 (1973).
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legitimate government.58 These rights would certainly include guaran-
tees of speech that allow people to challenge governmental policies.59
Moreover, Frankfurter's opinion in Dennis also responds to Bran-
deis' contention that free speech both promotes and manifests citizens'
possession of a liberal character. Curiously, Frankfurter defends the rea-
sonability of the Smith Act by noting that the volume of legislation com-
batting communism illustrates the seriousness of Congress' purpose.
This legislation, however, also indicates Congress' ability to fuel, and
then ease, the fears of constituents, casting further doubt on whether one
can trust Frankfurter's reasonability analysis to protect speech that is a
precondition of legitimate democratic government. Yet, it is not clear
that Frankfurter's faith in American democracy is naive. Confidence in
an electorate must not be confused with trust in the democratic process.
Frankfurter would agree that liberal citizens are courageous, and had
reason to believe that the American electorate lacked this character.
60
But, he questions whether people should, or even can, supplement the
absent virtue by having judges invalidate legislation that restricts free
speech.
Instead, Frankfurter believes that citizens can develop a liberal
character through democratic participation. From James Bradley
Thayer, he derives the belief that democracy instructs citizens in virtue.
Though he was never Frankfurter's teacher, Thayer had a tremendous
influence on Frankfurter.6 Thayer challenges trends in constitutional
law by which courts check legislative power by enforcing state constitu-
tional restrictions.62 He introduces two ideas that inform Frankfurter's
58. See William T. Coleman, Jr., Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter: Civil Libertarian as Lawyer
and as Justice: Extent to Which Judicial Responsibility Affected His Pre-Court Convictions,
reprinted in SIx JUSTICES ON CIVIL RIGHTS 91 (Ronald D. Rotunda ed., 1983).
59. See id. In a letter to Justice Stone concerning the Gobitis decision, Frankfurter's defense
of judicial restraint presupposes that the Gobitises possess First Amendment rights that enable
them to challenge the legislation that burdens their religious pursuits. See ALPHEUS THOMAS
MASON, SECURITY THROUGH FREEDOM app., at 217-20 (1955).
60. See infra notes 76-78.
61. See Frederic R. Kellog, Legal Scholarship in the Temple of Doom: Pragmatism's
Response to Critical Legal Studies, 65 TUL. L. REV. 15, 46 (1990); Felix Frankfurter, John
Marshall and the Judicial Function, in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, AND
FELIX FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL 149 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1967). Frankfurter
describes himself as "[O]ne brought up in the traditions of James Bradley Thayer, echoes of
whom were still resounding in this very building in my student days, is committed to Thayer's
statesmanlike conception of the limits within which the Supreme Court should move .. " See
also H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 128-29 (1981). Hirsch claims that
Thayer's defense of judicial restraint appealed to Frankfurter's patriotism and his preconceptions
about the possibility of social change through democratic participation by an educated citizenry.
62. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 37-39 (1929); James Bradley Thayer, John
Marshall, in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, AND FELIX FRANKFURTER ON
JOHN MARSHALL 83 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1967).
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narrow interpretation of the First Amendment: (1) that judicial review
impedes the health of a democracy by forestalling the development of
citizens' character; and (2) that this impediment arises because people
conflate ideas of constitutionality and wisdom.63 Thayer believes that
judicial review weakens democratic processes by encouraging legisla-
tors and their constituents to shift the responsibility of governance to the
judiciary.64 Representatives, thus, have an incentive to acquiesce to
unconstitutional demands of their constituents and trust courts to correct
their mistakes.6 5 Legislators who depend on the Court are prone to for-
get that honesty, fairness, honor, and-by implication-wisdom are not
synonymous with constitutionality.66 This dependency also diminishes
the capacities of citizens:
the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education
and stimulus that comes from fighting the question out... and cor-
recting their own errors. The tendency of a common and easy resort
to this great function ...is to dwarf the political capacity of the
people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.67
In Dennis, Frankfurter uses Thayer's theory of judicial restraint to
counter Brandeis' argument that judges should promote courage among
citizens by invalidating laws that limit free speech. Frankfurter seems to
acknowledge that the legislation at issue in Dennis is dangerous because
it quenches the free spirit. Frankfurter, however, applies Thayer's dis-
tinction between wisdom and constitutionality to justify judicial
restraint: "When legislation touches freedom of thought and freedom of
speech, such a tendency is a formidable enemy of the free spirit. Much
that should be rejected as illiberal, because repressive and envenoming,
may well be not unconstitutional. 68 Frankfurter's concern to instill lib-
eral virtues parallels the notion of courage expounded in Brandeis'
Whitney concurrence. 69 He links the well-being of civilization to the
character of its people, people whose confidence in their ability to rea-
son frees them from irrational fears. But, following Thayer, Frankfurter
denies that the salvation of the free spirit rests on the judiciary's enforce-
ment of the First Amendment:
63. See THAYER, supra note 62, at 38-39.
64. See Thayer, supra note 62, at 83-84.
65. See id.
66. See id.; THAYER, supra note 62, at 38-39.
67. Thayer, supra note 62, at 85-86.
68. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 556 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44; see also PHILLIPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND
PROGRESSIVISM 102-06 (1993); Levinson, supra note 57, at 431. Brandeis' discussion-in contrast
to Frankfurter's-is more immediately concerned with the democratic character, but it is
important to note that the book that so influenced Brandeis, Alfred Zimmem's The Greek
Commonwealth, was also a favorite of Frankfurter.
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The ultimate reliance for the deepest needs of civilization must be
found outside their vindication in courts of law; apart from all else,
judges, howsoever they may conscientiously seek to discipline them-
selves against it, unconsciously are too apt to be moved by the deep
undercurrents of public feeling. A persistent, positive translation of
the liberating faith into feelings and thoughts and actions of men and
women is the real protection against attempts to strait-jacket the
human mind. Such temptations will have their way, if fear and hatred
are not exorcised. The mark of a truly civilized man is confidence in
the strength and security derived from the inquiring mind. We may
be grateful for such honest comforts as it supports, but we must be
unafraid of its uncertitudes. Without open minds there can be no
open society. And if society be not open the spirit of man is muti-
lated and becomes enslaved.7 °
Although Frankfurter acknowledges that courage is the means to a civi-
lized society, Thayer's influence compels his conclusion that citizens
will be less likely to develop these virtues when judges enforce guaran-
tees of free speech. Frankfurter claims that "apart from all else,"
judges-as well as legislators-are influenced by public opinion, and
therefore, might not be able to counter "illiberal" and "envenoming" leg-
islation.71 His point is stronger. He adapts Thayer's claim that the
problems of a closed society are too deep to be corrected through judi-
cial enforcement of First Amendment values.72
Thayer's influence is also apparent in Frankfurter's early opinions
in Gobitis73 and Barnette."4 Frankfurter's opinion in Gobitis, which
upheld a school board regulation that compelled students to salute the
American flag, was overruled three years later in Barnette. Frankfurter
dissented from the reversal. These opinions outline the argument for
judicial restraint that Frankfurter subsequently employs in Dennis. He
concludes that the Court lacks the competence to overrule the judgment
of the legislatures and school boards that have addressed the issue.75
Yet, Frankfurter expresses skepticism about the legislation, and
introduces the distinction between wise and constitutional legislation to
70. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 556 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Frankfurter's concern for
civilization is obviously broader than Brandeis' concern for democracy, but his description of the
people of a civilized society clearly suggests Brandeis' discussion in Whitney.
71. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 556 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
72. See THAYER, supra note 62, at 39.
73. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
74. See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
75. See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 597. "To stigmatize legislative judgment in providing for this
universal gesture of respect for the symbol of our national life in the setting of the common school
as a lawless inroad on that freedom of conscience which the Constitution protects, would amount
to no less than the pronouncement of pedagogical and psychological dogma in a field where courts
possess no marked and certainly no controlling competence." Id.
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explain his refusal to invalidate it.76 When Frankfurter returns to the
question of judicial review, he combines Thayer and Brandeis to illus-
trate how legislatures promote liberty:
But to the legislature no less than to courts is committed the guardi-
anship of deeply cherished liberties. . . Where all the effective
means of inducing political change are left free from interference,
education in the abandonment of foolish legislation is itself a training
in liberty. To fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the
forum of public opinion and before legislative assemblies rather than
to transfer such a contest to the judicial arena, serves to vindicate the
self-confidence of a free people.77
As guardians of deeply cherished liberties, both the legislature and the
Court work to enforce rights that ensure the operation of the political
process, rights we have previously identified as preconditions for legiti-
mate political authority. Frankfurter, however, also claims that "legisla-
tion is itself a training in liberty," one that "serves to vindicate the self-
confidence of a free people. '78  These statements again parallel Bran-
deis' claims about free speech promoting courage. They define the char-
acter of a free person and the means to gain such a character.
In a later essay, Frankfurter's discussion of law extends the connec-
tion to Brandeis. We have seen that Brandeis believed that guarantees
of free speech are both the foundation for, and an expression of, the
courage citizens have after they gain confidence in the democratic insti-
tutions through which they exercise their rational faculties. Frankfurter
makes a similar point about law. He speaks of law as "presuppositions
on which government is conducted. .... "79 Law is more than a codifica-
tion of contemporary community values. It is also the means people use
76. See id. at 598. When Frankfurter shifts his analysis to the best means the government has
for promoting unity-what he believes to be the end sought by the legislature-he introduces the
possibility that exposure to diverse ideas-diversity that could be wrought by the Court's
enforcement of First Amendment values of free speech and free exercise of religion-might be a
better source for unity than mandatory flag salutes.
Even were we convinced of the folly of such a measure, such belief would be no
proof of its unconstitutionality. For ourselves, we might be tempted to say that the
deepest patriotism is best engendered by giving unfettered scope to the most
crotchety beliefs. Perhaps, it is best, even from the standpoint of those interests
which ordinances like the one under review seek to promote, to give to the least
popular sect leave from conformities like those here in issue.
Id. See also MASON, supra note 59. Frankfurter's skepticism about the legislation is also apparent
in a letter he wrote to Justice Stone: "I cannot rid myself of the notion that it is not fantastic,
although I think foolish and perhaps, worse, for school authorities to believe-as the record in this
case explicitly shows the school authorities to have believed-that to allow exemption to some of
the children goes far towards disrupting the whole patriotic exercise." Id. at 218-19.
77. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600.
78. Id.
79. Frankfurter, supra note 61, at 169.
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to infuse government with a spirit that allows the political community to
evolve. Law shapes citizens' character, and the relevant question for
Frankfurter becomes how to strengthen the character of citizens and
their representatives: "[W]hat matters most is whether the standards of
reason and fair dealing are bred in the bones of people."8 °
Frankfurter breaks with Brandeis-in favor of Thayer-when he
identifies the legislative, rather than the judicial power as the means to
strengthen citizens' character. Democratic participation-not the judici-
ary's enforcement of the First Amendment-promotes a society in
which citizens have the character to rid themselves of foolish or para-
noid legislation.81
IV. CONFUSION WROUGHT BY BRANDEIS' DEFENSE OF FREE SPEECH
It is puzzling that commentators dismiss or venerate Frankfurter's
defense of judicial restraint without recognizing that he adopts Brandeis'
goal of enforcing a conception of the First Amendment that promotes a
liberal citizenry. This response might be attributable to the influence of
Brandeis' opinion,82 as well as to Frankfurter's failure to specify how
increased political participation leads citizens to develop a liberal char-
acter.8 3 The power of Brandeis' rhetoric might distract people who
would otherwise examine his individual arguments: Guarantees of free
speech promote collective and particular interests that condition political
legitimacy; and guarantees of free speech manifest citizens' desire to
strengthen their character.84 Although these guarantees might contribute
to citizens' deliberations about collective and particular interests, citi-
zens do not necessarily affirm the value of a liberal character when they
endorse the actions of judges who enforce these guarantees.
People who conflate these arguments have difficulties when they
must respond to restrictions of speech that indicate citizens' lack of lib-
80. Id. at 168-69.
81. See MASON, supra note 59, at app. In his letter to Stone, Frankfurter states that his
intention
•.. was to use this opinion as a vehicle for preaching the true democratic faith of not
relying on the Court for the impossible task of assuring a vigorous, mature, self-
protecting and tolerant democracy by bringing the responsibility for a combination
of firmness and toleration directly home where it belongs-to the people and their
representatives themselves.
Id. at 220. See also Frankfurter, supra note 61, at 157. Frankfurter cites his concurring opinion in
AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 555-57 (1949), to express skepticism about
democracy through judicial regents as a way to "foster disciplined responsibility in a people."
82. See Bork, supra note 21, at 24.
83. I will try to establish the connection between political participation and liberal virtues
through an analysis of controversies regarding flag-burning and hate speech. See infra text
accompanying notes 90-249.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
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eral virtues. Guarantees of free speech might promote important collec-
tive and particular interests, but people will not necessarily become
liberal when judges enforce these guarantees. When we assume that
broad guarantees of free speech express citizens' regard for a liberal
character, we beg the question that concerns Frankfurter: Do courts bet-
ter promote the development of liberal citizens by enforcing the First
Amendment or by giving elected institutions responsibility to combat
repressive legislation?
After providing an example of how Brandeis' defense of free
speech can lead commentators to confuse his different arguments, this
essay turns to recent controversies involving legislation restricting flag-
burning and hate speech. These controversies illustrate how easy it is to
overestimate citizens' passion for free speech. They also suggest that
judicial restraint in response to such legislation would have created
political conditions that would lead many citizens to recognize how
guarantees of free speech contribute to the development of their
character.
Consider Lee Bollinger's thesis that free speech contributes to dem-
ocratic government by teaching citizens the virtue of tolerance. Bollin-
ger follows the path blazed by Brandeis in Whitney, and does not seem
to recognize the need to question the motivations that underlie people's
commitment to free speech. Therefore, he does not give adequate con-
sideration to whether protecting certain forms of speech might prevent
citizens from developing the virtue he commends.
According to Bollinger, democracy fails if citizens cannot control
the impulse to censor ideas that challenge personal beliefs or undermine
particular interests.85 He defends protection for extremist speech-such
as the right of neo-Nazis to march in Skokie, Illinois-because he
believes that exposure to such speech is particularly effective in
imparting lessons in tolerance, and thereby, fosters greater rationality in
democratic legislation.86
85. See BOLLINGER, supra note 35, at 92-93, 105-08.
86. See id. at 112, 125, 133, 173-75. First, public toleration of extremist speech has symbolic
power. Extending tolerance to extremist speech sharpens the pedagogical facility of the message
of tolerance. "By pursuing the 'principle' to its logical end, well beyond what the particulars of
individual cases call for ... , the society impresses on itself the importance of the lesson . . . . 'To
straighten a bent stick you bend it back the other way."' Id. at 125. Second, extremist expression
provides examples of the quality of mind people should avoid. As the expression at issue in
Skokie demonstrates, extremist speech reflects people's tendency to suppress ideas that challenge
their own understandings. Bollinger believes that exposure to extremist speech actually sensitizes
people to the basic human impulse that is manifest by censorship, racism, anti-semitism, and other
forms of prejudice. Finally, not only does extremist speech reflect the mental weakness of
speakers, it forces listeners to confront the complexity of their own character. Censorship of
extremist speech allows people to deny their own impulses toward prejudice. It creates a
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Bollinger thinks that tolerant citizens are more likely to: (1) recog-
nize valuable arguments, even those that threaten particular interests;
and (2) subordinate their particular interests when ideas they reject
achieve democratic success. In a stable democracy, people must learn to
confront unfamiliar or threatening ideas with an open mind. Citizens
must be willing to assess the value of these ideas. Yet, Bollinger's argu-
ment, that we should tolerate extremist speech to teach ourselves toler-
ance, depends on people's willingness to tolerate ideas that they can
readily dismiss.87 It reinforces people's tendency to be tolerant when
they have confidence in their own opinions. But it is not likely that
people, who tolerate ideas because they are confident that these ideas are
wrong, will develop the quality of mind Bollinger seeks.
Bollinger does not examine the basis for people's toleration; he
seems to assume that people tolerate because of a liberal character. If
anything, Bollinger's idea of tolerance teaches citizens to accommodate
ideas so reprehensible that people learn to tolerate based on the arro-
gance that arises from certainty. His discussion of statements-made by
participants in the Skokie case-that convey the need for tolerance
despite the repugnance of Nazism are illustrative:
The federal court of appeals, after making its opening declaration of
sympathy with the beliefs of the Skokie community, then changed
ground rapidly and pronounced its own personal views as irrelevant
to its assigned task .... "As judges sworn to defend the Constitution
... we cannot decide this case or any case on that basis. Ideological
tyranny, no matter how worthy its motivation, is forbidden as much
to judges as to elected legislators."88
and:
It is there, in the prologue, that Neier speaks not only as the director
of the ACLU but also as an individual, as a Jew, and he speaks with a
stirring voice. He recites his "credentials" for despising Nazis,
recounting his last minute escape from Hitler Germany as a young
boy. "I recite my own background.., to suggest why I am unwilling
to put anything, even love of free speech, ahead of detestation of
scapegoat to assume responsibility for people's innate capacity for intolerance, which becomes
uncomfortably apparent upon exposure to extremist speech.
87. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 142-43 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
Kalven criticizes Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), for only
protecting trivial speech. Holmes' idea is eloquently stated by the epigram "sticks and stones may
break my bones, but names will never hurt me." We teach children to ignore speech rather than
take it seriously. As advice, it is effective at avoiding violence, but it denies children an
opportunity of self-reflection, the ability to see themselves from another's perspective and respond
to that perspective. It is also not accurate. See generally Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free
Speech, in THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND
PORNOGRAPHY (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995).
88. BOLLINGER, supra note 35, at 30.
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Nazis."89
In both statements, the importance of tolerance is conveyed by the
writer's powerful motivation for suppression. They are effective
because they appeal to people's confidence that extremist speech is
false, and people's recognition that there is good reason to despise its
substance. However, they do not teach the quality of toleration that Bol-
linger seeks. People who learn to tolerate extremely offensive ideas that
are obviously false might also learn to tolerate other ideas they consider
offensive. It would be surprising, however, if tolerating Nazi speech
teaches people to suspend presuppositions about their own beliefs and
confront the challenge posed by offensive ideas that deserve their
attention.
Bollinger's mistakes indicate how readily we assume that people
who endorse guarantees of free speech have a liberal character, and the
importance of determining whether judges promote such a character
when they enforce guarantees of free speech. Brandeis' Whitney opin-
ion masks the need to address these questions; it obscures differences in
how people view guarantees of free speech.
These differences inform contemporary free speech controversies
involving flag-burning and racist speech. These controversies indicate
that people value free speech because it contributes to their definition
and pursuit of particular interests. They also suggest that people who
view free speech in this manner lack the virtues that Brandeis and Frank-
furter celebrate, and do not affirm the value of a liberal character when
they endorse the actions of judges who enforce guarantees of free
speech. Therefore, these controversies provide an opportunity to test the
thesis that by refusing to invalidate illiberal legislation, judges can pro-
mote a political environment that will strengthen citizens' character.
V. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AS A RESPONSE TO LEGISLATION
RESTRICTING FLAG-BURNING AND HATE SPEECH
Many have noted that people tend to tolerate speech they like, but
not speech they despise. 90 Although people sometimes reveal this ten-
dency, the point is exaggerated. Most people have some commitment to
free speech and readily tolerate expression they reject as offensive, or
even as dangerous. 9' Nonetheless, there is an interesting tension under-
89. Id. at 98. Although this statement precedes the speaker's justification of a model of free
speech that Bollinger criticizes, it is an example of a message in which the value of tolerance is
manifest by the depth of the speaker's hatred for the tolerated speech.
90. See, e.g., NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT THEE (1992).
91. 1 am not interested in the small minority who do not have any commitment to free speech:
those who would regulate offensive speech without consideration of any First Amendment
interest. My concern is why people make exceptions to the free speech principles they endorse.
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lying contemporary debates about free speech. People celebrate free
speech passionately, but without reflection. It is not unusual for people
to endorse guarantees of free speech in grand terms that suggest that
they value a liberal character. For example, people often link free
speech to the pursuit of truth or express concern that a limitation on
speech is the first step toward totalitarianism. But, the breadth of these
claims suggests that the speakers have not thought about the value of
free speech and its relationship to a liberal character.
Recent controversies concerning legislation restricting flag-burning
and hate speech illustrate that we should not assume that people mani-
fest or affirm their liberal character when they praise free speech. Yet, it
is not clear that we should endorse Frankfurter's view: that judges
should exercise restraint, and thereby, encourage democratic participa-
tion that will strengthen citizens' character.
Citizens have incentive to develop liberal virtues that facilitate their
pursuit of particular interests. Liberal citizens gain political advantage
to the extent that they become more adept at considering the interests of
others and identifying potential allies with whom they can combine to
pursue an agenda that encompasses their favored policies. Citizens
advance their interests by adapting their ends in response to the political
pressures that necessitate compromise and reward those who can forge
alliances.
The transformation Frankfurter anticipates, however, is not likely to
result from a single political controversy. One would expect people to
develop liberal virtues from political experience over time and across a
range of issues. It would be surprising if judges significantly influenced
the extent of this experience by invalidating restrictions on flag-burning
and hate speech. In addition, the issues of flag-burning and hate speech
do not provide a strong incentive to develop liberal virtues. Citizens
respond to these issues emotionally, and therefore, will have greater dif-
ficulty identifying the interests of others from which a compromise can
be forged. The problem of identification is further exacerbated by the
abstractness of the interests at stake in the flag-burning controversy-a
commitment to free speech on one side and a much greater commitment
to the freedoms represented by the flag on the other side. While it is
easier to identify the interests involved in the controversy about hate
speech, the controversy itself has garnered much less attention except in
the communities where restrictions have been debated.92
Nonetheless, the controversies involving flag-burning and hate
92. The flag-burning controversy has gained much more attention and generated a much
greater political response. The issue of hate speech has produced a significant academic debate, as
well as debate at university campuses that have struggled with the issue of speech codes.
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speech suggest that judges would have transformed the political environ-
ment if they had refused to invalidate restrictions on speech. In both
cases, judicial restraint would encourage substantive debate that could
lead citizens to appreciate the value of free speech. In the case of hate
speech, judicial restraint would also engender conflicts between people's
interests, and these conflicts would promote greater empathy among
citizens.
A. Flag-Burning
1. CITIZENS' ATTITUDES ABOUT FREE SPEECH AND THE
POLITICAL COMMUNITY
Most people recognize that the government undermines interests
advanced by guarantees of free speech when it censors critical messages,
such as those that are sometimes expressed by burning an American
flag. Americans are taught to fear governmental tyranny: They tend to
view the exercise of governmental power suspiciously, and consider
guarantees of free speech a means to control that power. People often
express their readiness to combat restrictions on public discussion
through a variant of the grandest of free speech cliches: "I reject what
you say, but I'll defend with my life your right to say it."
Moreover, many have put this thought into action. Citizens have
fought wars in the name of freedom; it informs their conception of the
political community, and, curiously enough, veterans seek to protect the
flag as an embodiment of this ideal.93 Yet, few people would risk their
lives to save flag-burners from prosecution, even though such prosecu-
tions seem to violate the ideal. 94 Many people's concern for free speech
is overwhelmed by a desire to punish flag burners-or worse, if we
believe many of the bumper stickers that appeared in the aftermath of
Texas v. Johnson.95
Those who seek to punish flag-burners reveal their tenuous com-
mitment to free speech. Although people who attack flag-burners wish
to protect the flag as a symbol of America and its promise of freedom-
including freedom of speech-their disgust at flag-burners prevents
them from considering whether their actions undercut guarantees of free
speech that advance their own interests. They clearly have little concern
for how free speech contributes to the development of their character.
To support these assertions, two related distinctions must be made.
93. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 425 (1989) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); see also id.
at 436, 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opposing a decision striking down a state law proscribing the
burning of the American flag).
94. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418.
95. See id. at 425, 436, 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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First, a message that criticizes the government of the United States must
be distinguished from a message that criticizes America. Flag-burners
have desecrated a symbol of America to draw attention to their criticism
of governmental policies. 96 Second, people's commitment to the gov-
ernment must be distinguished from their commitment to country.
Those who wish to censor flag-burners respond to the insult against their
country. Love of country, however, does not necessarily translate into
love of government. Many people who attack flag-burners readily toler-
ate extreme attacks on the government.
Consider the public response to the Freemen and other groups that
reject the authority of the United States government. These groups, like
flag-burners, challenge governmental authority. 97 Yet, public outcry
against flag-burners is much more severe. People who attack flag-burn-
ers often share the Freemen's concern for limited government.98 But, a
love of freedom does not necessarily translate into a strong commitment
to the political community; many people tolerate a political community
that leaves them alone.
We would expect people whose commitment to the political com-
munity rests on benefits they derive from avoiding the burdens of polit-
ical association to view guarantees of free speech as means for
preventing the government from interfering with particular interests.
Not surprisingly, people who hold such views show little concern about
government restrictions on speech that do not implicate their particular
interests. Some might consider the prosecution of flag-burners an early
but significant threat to particular interests. But for most people, such
prosecutions do not threaten the freedom they enjoy. To the contrary,
many people protect the flag from defilement, in order to reaffirm this
freedom by honoring the symbol that most closely embodies it.
96. See id. at 399. See also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (striking down a
federal law proscribing the burning of the American flag). The defendant in Texas v. Johnson
sought to enhance a protest of policies of the Reagan administration and certain Dallas-based
corporations. In United States v. Eichman, the defendants burned the flag as a vehicle for political
protest and to challenge legislation proscribing flag-burning. Of course, the message that is
critical of country tends to overwhelm the substantive message to which it is intended to draw
attention.
97. See James Brooke, Judge Displays His Patience as the Freemen Display Their
Contentiousness, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1996, at B6. At a preliminary hearing, one Freeman
refused to acknowledge the authority of the flag.
98. See Eric Felten, The Movies, the Enemy and the Government, WASH. TIMES, July 4, 1996,
at A15. People's attitudes toward the Freemen changed as the extent of their anti-government
radicalism became clearer. See David Johnstone, Isolation Led to End for Freemen, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, June 16, 1996, at B2; Carey Goldberg, Mediator in Freemen Deal Tells How It Nearly
Failed, N.Y TIMES, June 15, 1996, at A10; Freemen Surrender Ending 81 Day Standoff, L.A.
TIMES, June 14, 1996, at Al.
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2. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AS A RESPONSE TO RESTRICTIONS ON
FLAG-BURNING
The controversy concerning flag-burning illustrates how people's
strong commitment to particular interests can mask a weaker commit-
ment to free speech. It is illuminating to examine this controversy in
light of Frankfurter's defense of judicial restraint; would judicial
restraint in response to restrictions on flag-burning promote a political
environment in which citizens recognize the value of free speech? On
the one hand, flag-burning might be such an emotional issue that it is not
reasonable to believe that democratic debate will lead people to over-
come their zeal and recognize how free speech contributes to the devel-
opment of their character. Moreover, the issue might not have garnered
any attention but for the possibility of the Court striking down anti-flag-
burning statutes. On the other hand, restrictions on flag-burning only
have a slight influence on the collective and particular interests that are
conditions of political legitimacy. In addition, while there is no doubt
that Texas v. Johnson ignited a national debate on flag-burning, this
debate has not encouraged discussion about the value of free speech.99
Our experience after Johnson suggests that if the Court had let stand the
restriction on flag-burning, debate about free speech would have been
conducted at a higher level. Such a debate would lead some citizens to a
better understanding of how they advance their pursuit of particular
interests by honoring guarantees of free speech. This benefit would out-
weigh the negative affects of the restriction.
a. Flag-Burning and Political Legitimacy
Legislation that proscribes flag-burning has little impact on inter-
ests that a legitimate government must protect. Neither the ability to
define community values nor the ability to define and pursue particular
interests is undermined by proscriptions against flag-burning. Very few
99. It is possible, however, that an expectation of judicial restraint would foreclose the
possibility of any public discussion of flag-burning; defendants prosecuted for flag-burning would
not challenge the constitutionality of their prosecution. Once the Court limits the occasions in
which it exercises judicial review, some restrictions on speech will be assumed constitutional and
will not garner the attention that free speech cases currently gain. Thus, these restrictions might
never come to the public's attention. In addition, one would expect that these restrictions would
be like flag-burning restrictions-and not like restrictions on hate speech-in that without a Court
case, they would generate little political controversy, because they do not involve important
interests. It would be unfortunate if judicial restraint led to a political community in which no one
noticed the prosecution of flag-burners. On the other hand, I believe that, overall, restraint would
enhance discussion about the value of free speech and would make the prosecution of flag-burners
less likely. Moreover, it seems likely that prosecution of flag-burners would continue to draw
local attention-and perhaps some national attention-even if the possibility of judicial review
was remote.
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people wish to indulge in this freedom, and those who do have effica-
cious alternatives for communicating their messages critical of both gov-
ernment and country. People denied the opportunity to deliver their
message in the form they choose would be harmed to the extent that
their messages reach a smaller audience once stripped from the inflam-
matory attack against country. But, democracies do not gain legitimacy
by guaranteeing citizens a wide or attentive audience for their speech. 00
Moreover, although a speaker might attract a broader audience by burn-
ing a flag, the incendiary means for delivering the message draws atten-
tion from its substance. It does not behoove a politician to disturb a
quiet street with a soundtruck at three in the morning.' Similarly,
burning a flag is likely to generate such contempt for the speaker that
people would be less willing to consider the message.
Kent Greenawalt recognizes that restrictions on flag-burning do not
undermine political legitimacy. He identifies the controversy's silver
lining: Our fixation on an issue as trivial as flag-burning suggests gen-
eral contentment with our political institutions. 0 2 He believes that peo-
ple's focus on the issue of flag-burning indicates consensus about
"broadly liberal premises" defining the limits of free speech; "[t]hat peo-
ple worry so much about this narrow form of political expression, rather
than the substance of political dissent, suggests a firm understanding
supporting broad latitude for dissent."'0 3
Our analysis of flag-burning, however, suggests the breadth of peo-
ple's commitment to free speech masks its shallowness. Greenawalt too,
fears that people's faith in the flag is not rooted in any deeper belief, and
that the government can exploit the vacuity of their faith by wrapping its
policies in the good will generated by the flag.° 4 Thus, although Green-
awalt notes the risk in undercutting the values the flag symbolizes when
we tolerate its defilement, he concludes that concern for the shallowness
of people's faith in the flag counter-balances this risk. His analysis con-
firms that, while we should be thankful for a government that sustains its
legitimacy through sufficient guarantees of free speech, we must be
wary that people tend to be unreflective about the concepts of freedom
that give meaning to the symbol of the flag.
100. Moreover, there are alternative means for making a spectacle of oneself. These means
serve the purpose of luring an audience just as well.
101. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 110 (1980).
102. See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS 28-29 (1995).
103. Id. at 29.
104. See id. at 42-44.
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b. Judicial Restraint as a Means to Strengthen Citizens' Commitment
to Free Speech
The question remains whether judges should let stand restrictions
on flag-burning. Will the effort to repeal these restrictions strengthen
citizens' commitment to free speech, as they discover how guarantees of
free speech facilitate their pursuit of particular interests? Some people
might respond that high profile cases, such as Johnson, provide the
Court with an opportunity to teach citizens the value of their rights. °5
Greenawalt notes that the Johnson opinions, in contrast to more ordinary
Court opinions, employ non-legalistic arguments in order to convince a
wider audience."°6 Others have criticized the Johnson opinions for
being more legalistic than those in Barnette.10 7 These critics claim that
the justices scuttled an opportunity to inform a wider audience about the
importance of free speech.108 But, most citizens do not pay attention to
the workings of the Supreme Court, and often misunderstand rulings
when they do. '09 In addition, citizens have less incentive to consider the
Court's arguments as this impact grows. Johnson presents particular
difficulties because the Court's opinion had to convince citizens whose
interest in the case was emotional and intense. These considerations
reduce the efficacy of judicial pedagogy.110
Experience since Johnson confirms this conclusion. Politicians
immediately sought to exploit citizens' emotional response to the deci-
sion, and thereby, undercut any chance that citizens would consider the
Court's arguments."'I Moreover, this experience provides evidence to
105. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv.
193, 208 (1952).
106. See id. at 41.
107. See, e.g., Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Barnette and Johnson: A Tale of Two Opinions, 75
IOWA L. REv. 417 (1990).
108. See id. at 430-31.
109. See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 135-36, 142-45
(1989); EDWARD J. CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS 180 (1994). Cleary describes the
inability of both the public and the press to grasp the issues involved in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992). The abortion controversy provides another example of people's difficulties
following the Court's work, and in understanding it. The abortion debate has dominated
American politics more than any other recent issue the Court has addressed. Yet, few people
realize that the Court significantly narrowed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Moreover, I find that most people I ask, including
many people who pay attention to politics, believe that the Court will outlaw abortion if it reverses
Roe. See also BENJAMIN PAGE & ROBERT SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC 76-80, 107 (1992).
Page and Shapiro note that the Court seems to have little influence on the public's attitude
concerning civil rights and abortion.
110. In contrast, legislative battles usually require people to be less concerned with winning
fights. Citizens respond to political conflicts by finding common ground with people whose
interests oppose their own.
I 1l. Immediately after the Court issued its ruling, lawmakers and President Bush lined up to
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support Thayer's contention that judicial review encourages legislators
and citizens to shift responsibility to the Supreme Court-rather than
fight themselves-to combat legislation they consider unjust and
unwise. 112 Most politicians recognize that their electoral well-being dic-
tates a negative response to Johnson."3 Their constituents showed little
inclination to address the arguments of the majority opinion." 4
Congress responded to Johnson with The Flag Protection Act of
1989," a statute designed to circumvent Johnson by exploiting divi-
sions on the Court. Instead of addressing the Johnson majority's con-
cern about limits on free speech, the federal statute sought to assuage the
Court by emphasizing concern for the physical integrity of the flag,
rather than for any message associated with it." 6 Representatives, sena-
tors, and the President all had strong incentives to support this legisla-
tion.1"' Given that elected officials are more educated than the average
citizen, and considering that many officials are lawyers whose training
includes indoctrination concerning the value of free speech, it is likely
that at least some who supported this legislation found it unwise, if not
unconstitutional. 118  Yet, few would sacrifice a political career to a
defense of free speech, especially when one considers that similarities
between the Texas and federal statutes provided reason to believe that
the Court would invalidate the legislation." 9
The Court's opinion in United States v. Eichman proved such
beliefs to be well-founded. The continuing effort to pass a constitutional
amendment to overturn both Eichman and Johnson indicates that politi-
denounce the decision. See Robin Toner, Bush and Many in Congress Denounce Flag Ruling,
N.Y TIMES, June 23, 1989, at A8.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
113. See GREENAWALT, supra note 102, at 36-37.
114. See id.
115. The Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (Oct. 28, 1989)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988)).
116. See GREENAWALT, supra note 102, at 37.
117. See Robin Toner, Senate Attempts to Reinstate Law on Desecration of Flags, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 1989, at A8; Robin Toner, Washington Talk; Politics, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1989, at B6.
Within two days of the ruling, the Senate addressed legislation designed to overturn the ruling.
Democrats denounced the decision. Michael Dukakis' response to the previous year's flag-salute
controversy had illustrated the consequences of appearing unpatriotic. President Bush quickly
asked his Attorney General to submit a plan to respond to the Court's ruling. See Bernard
Weinraub, Bush Seeking Way to Circumvent Court's Decision on Flag Burning, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 1989, at Al.
118. See Robin Toner, Amendment on the Flag Raises Fears in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 1990, at A22. In approaching a proposed constitutional amendment to protect the flag,
lawmakers feared that a negative vote would be perceived as a vote against the flag. See Robin
Toner, Politicians Forced to Confront Issue of Defacing Flag, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1990, at Al.
119. Even if the Court had endorsed the charade, that too would ease the burden of legislative
responsibility.
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cians expect benefits from inciting their constituents on this issue. 120 It
suggests that we should be skeptical about claims that judges can over-
come strong prejudices and employ powerful justifications of free
speech to teach citizens the value of their rights.
Politicians, of course, continue to have an incentive to exploit citi-
zens' anger about flag-burning. This incentive continues to fuel the
movement to amend the Constitution, and indicates that politicians will
be ready to sacrifice constitutional principle to their electoral interest,
whether or not a court has the power to correct their mistakes. Thus,
even if the Johnson Court had upheld the proscription against flag-burn-
ing, Texas legislators would have had little reason to advance the argu-
ments of those seeking to repeal the proscription. A legislator who tried
to present these arguments in a public forum would invite defeat at the
next election.
Nonetheless, given the likelihood that public discourse about free
speech would have been conducted at a higher level had the Johnson
Court let stand the proscription against flag-burning, it is possible that
judicial restraint would encourage citizens to recognize the benefits
derived from robust guarantees of free speech. We have already seen
how opponents of the Johnson opinion excited and galvanized existing
opinion so as to pressure politicians. They activated this opinion with-
out any significant discussion of free speech. The opponents of Johnson
attacked the character of flag-burners and implicitly-sometimes explic-
itly-the patriotism of those who defended free speech. 121 Had the situ-
ation been reversed, defenders of free speech would have had to change
public sentiment about the treatment of flag-burners. To do so, they
would have had to demonstrate the value of free speech, and convince
people of their interest in tolerating extremely offensive expression.
More significantly, the Johnson opinion ensured that defenders of
free speech would face a hostile audience. People would have been
more tolerant and receptive of arguments defending free speech if they
had thought that those arguments would not harm their interests; friends
of the flag would respond better to an argument about why a decision
they favor is wrong than they would to an argument about why they
should be thankful their defense of the flag failed. 122 It is not surprising
that in the aftermath of Johnson, defenders of free speech outside of the
120. President Bush called for a constitutional amendment to protect the flag on the same day
that the Eichman decision was handed down. See Robin Toner, Patriotism and Politics Mix in
Reaction to Flag Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1990, at B6.
121. See HE, rroFF, supra note 90, at 233-35.
122. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 434 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Rehnquist describes the
majority opinion as a "regrettably patronizing civics lecture."
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government seem almost as muted as the politicians who refuse to
defend the Johnson holding.
One could argue that the Johnson opinion will lead to a higher level
of discourse about the value of free speech, once opponents of the opin-
ion pursue their attacks through a constitutional amendment. Leaving
aside the problems associated with amending the Constitution over such
a trivial issue,'23 the claim that the debate about the proposed amend-
ment will enhance discourse about free speech advances' 24 Frankfurter's
position. Defenders of free speech would have a greater incentive to
present their case, because they could no longer trust the Court to com-
bat legislation they find unwise or silly. In addition, proponents of a
constitutional amendment would give more consideration to their oppo-
nents' arguments. Amending the Constitution is a more serious step
than legislation, because of the difficulty of overturning the decision.
The same reasoning supports Frankfurter's claim that citizens and legis-
lators will take legislative processes more seriously as the likelihood of
judicial review decreases.125
B. Hate Speech
The debate concerning hate speech also illustrates how passion for
free speech is not girded by citizens' desire to develop a liberal charac-
ter. Many participants on both sides of this debate are primarily con-
cerned with advancing particular interests. Their response to restrictions
on hate speech suggests that they do not affirm the value of a liberal
character.
More significantly, restrictions on hate speech do not necessarily
burden the collective and particular interests that condition political
legitimacy. This essay defines hate speech as any form of expression
through which speakers primarily intend to vilify, humiliate, or incite
hatred against their targets. The concept of primary intention invites an
observer to gauge whether the speakers' desire to communicate ideas-
ideas other than hate towards their targets-outweighed their desire to
injure their victims. It is possible that someone might consider a
123. See GREENAWALT, supra note 102, at 45.
124. One caveat arises from the complexity of the amendment process. Proposed amendments
usually arise from a two-thirds vote in each House of Congress. In addition to the difficulty of
overcoming the super-majoritarian requirement-even given the power of public sentiment
against flag-burning, and especially when we consider that two-thirds of the Senate will not face
an immediate reelection campaign-opponents of the amendment can exploit the rules of
Congress that would allow a proposal to die without forcing legislators to vote, or even publicly
debate, the proposal.
125. Of course, the finality of a constitutional amendment and the reverence with which we
view the Constitution would continue to make people consider the amendment process a more
serious business than the legislative process.
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speaker's criticisms or comments humiliating or hateful, even though the
speaker did not intend his speech as an attack. Speakers will sometimes
wish to communicate ideas that others find hurtful, and might even try to
justify the suffering they cause others based on the importance of the
ideas they communicate. In contrast, one should conclude that speakers
employ hate speech if their attacks are so virulent that an observer would
have great difficulty separating the message delivered from the attack
against the victim. For example, one can distinguish speech that con-
demns homosexuality from speech that attacks homosexuals. A speaker
might consider homosexuality a grave sin and believe that a person will
suffer grievously if he or she engages in homosexual acts. This speaker
might use incendiary language to convince homosexuals of the mistakes
he believes they make. While there is certainly a grey area in which it
will be difficult to determine the intent of the speaker, at some point, the
enmity of the message will overwhelm its substance, and the personal
attack will predominate. At this point, the speaker has used hate speech.
Restrictions on hate speech do not impose significant costs, espe-
cially when one considers that a democratic response to such restrictions
could strengthen citizens' character. The controversy concerning hate
speech would be transformed if the political community could nurture
liberal citizens who recognize how free speech contributes to the devel-
opment of their character. Liberal citizens would empathize with the
victims of hate speech; they would not employ hate speech and would
condemn those who do in terms that would discourage its use. The vic-
tims of hate speech would join the political community in condemning
their assailants as immature and vicious; they would view hate speech as
an anomalous artifact of a more repressive society rather than a manifes-
tation of the injustice of the contemporary social-order. Therefore, one
must determine whether judges can strengthen citizens' character by
refusing to invalidate legislation that restricts hate speech.
1. CITIZENS' ATTITUDES ABOUT FREE SPEECH AND A
LIBERAL CHARACTER
The controversy concerning hate speech is more complex and sig-
nificant than the flag-burning controversy. Therefore, this controversy
will be examined more closely. In particular, I will outline a legislative
response to hate speech that will not impede the ends advanced by guar-
antees of free speech.
Although the effort to restrict flag-burning has taken greater hold of
the public's attention, the debate about hate speech has been more sub-
stantive. The defenders of free speech are much more animated than
those in the flag-burning debate, and the harms that hate speech inflicts
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are more serious. Thus, efforts to restrict hate speech, most notably
restrictions implemented on university campuses, have generated discus-
sions that articulate the interests on each side of the controversy and-in
contrast to those in the flag-burning controversy-transcend the emo-
tional core of the debate. These discussions force people to justify the
value they place on free speech.
While the flag-burning controversy clearly marked a limit to peo-
ple's commitment to free speech, the debate about restrictions on hate
speech blurs the boundary. Because the debate has focused on univer-
sity speech codes,126 participants have included many"2 7 who commit
themselves to the pursuit of knowledge and revere the liberal virtues that
advance it. These discussions reveal a strong respect for free speech,
and often employ the language of First Amendment jurisprudence. 28
Participants worry that the restrictions are too vague or are overbroad so
as to have a "chilling effect" on students. 29 They are sensitive to abuses
of government power that could result if officials slide down the slip-
pery slope of restricting offensive communication. 30 Some participants
seek to balance free speech against the evils of harassment or fighting
words.13 ' Yet, their statements tend to border on cliche; they seldom
explain the value of free speech, except for making excessively general
statements linking free speech to the quest for truth. 132 Consequently,
these discussions make it difficult to identify why the disputants value
free speech. Moreover, in gauging the public's commitment to free
speech, one must remember that most people did not participate in the
debates about university speech codes; the few people who are aware of
126. The public debate on hate speech centered on campus controversies concerning speech
codes. Interestingly, public awareness of legislative debate about statutes restricting hate speech
was comparatively non-existent. The Supreme Court decision in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul gained
some attention, but I do not think that the public has the same awareness of this case as it does of
the campus debates. More significantly, it seems as if the Court's opinion in that case has
dampened public debate on the topic. An examination of the New York Times' coverage of the
fight concerning university speech codes supports this conclusion. The Times' coverage of the
issue crests in 1991, the year before R.A.V. It is also interesting to note that in 1991, President
Bush addressed the issue in a commencement speech, a good indicator that the issue had attracted
the public's attention. See Maureen Dowd, Bush Sees Threat to Flow of Ideas on U.S. Campuses,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1991, at Al.
127. The incidents on campus that lead to the adoption and enforcement of speech codes make
clear that all members do not share these commitments, and the debate about these incidents
suggests a difference between revering and possessing liberal virtues. See infra notes 234-40.
128. The debates have also been shaped by the participation of constitutional law scholars.
129. See Warren George Sandmann, Jr., Freedom of Expression and/or Freedom from Racial
and Sexual Harassment: College Campuses and Hate-Speech Codes 88, 105, 124, 129, 131, 163-
70 (May, 1992) (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Iowa) (on file with author).
130. See id. at 117-19, 124, 131.
131. See id. at 82, 87, 126-27, 129, 131, 137, 160-62.
132. See id. at 89, 91, 105, 120-21, 127, 137.
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them probably gained their information through the filter of authors,
commentators, and journalists, who situate the debate in the context of
larger controversies about political correctness and culture wars.
Statements made by participants in the campus discussions about
restrictions on hate speech, as well as the broader public debate, illus-
trate how particular interests guide people on both sides of the contro-
versy. Of course, people can focus on particular interests and still affirm
the value of a liberal character when they endorse guarantees of free
speech. Brandeis' argument presupposes it; citizens who value free
speech recognize that it contributes to the process by which they review,
revise, and select their ends.' 33 It would be strange if people sought to
develop a liberal character because it led them to make better choices
about their ends, but did not value the particular interests they chose.
Those who oppose restrictions, however, tend to concentrate on
how laws that limit hate speech affect their particular interests. In con-
trast, it is unusual to hear people defend free speech in terms analogous
to Brandeis' Whitney concurrence. This suggests that people do not link
free speech to the development of a liberal character, and would be slow
to subordinate particular interests in order to extend the benefits of free
speech to those with competing interests.
People who wish to employ hate speech view guarantees of free
speech as a shield against government interference with their pursuit of
particular interests. They have no interest in participating in discussion
that could influence their deliberations about collective or particular
interests.' 34 People who use hate speech discourage response. Hate
speech affords them no opportunity to engage the ideas of their victims,
or of others who might challenge the substance of their message. Hate
speech does not seek a response and is often used to intimidate its vic-
tims: Racist speech invites silence, resentment, and violence rather than
discussion.
135
Many people who oppose government restrictions on hate speech,
however, also condemn racism and take great offense at such expres-
sion. Some might condemn regulations on hate speech from fear that
their latent prejudices or controversial opinions will expose them to
133. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
134. See CLEARY, supra note 109, at 88-90. Cleary, the attorney for R.A.V., discusses the
different amici briefs filed with the Supreme Court. These include a brief filed by the Patriot
Defense Foundation, a group that often represents the Ku Klux Klan. Their brief states that their
interest in the case was to "protect the vital First Amendment rights of political activists ... who
advocate that the United States should remain a predominantly Christian, Anglo-Saxon, and
European derived nation ..... Id.
135. See GREENAWALT, supra note 102, at 49-64; ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS
293-99 (1995).
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prosecution. 36 Many people, though loath to burn crosses or engage in
direct verbal attacks, harbor prejudices about the virtue, intelligence or
character of those different from themselves and sometimes express
these prejudices.
Citizens who genuinely oppose discrimination and the repugnant
expression that fuels the movement to restrict hate speech, 137 can also
imagine circumstances in which their own expression could be suscepti-
ble to criticism. People recognize that they are not in perfect control of
what they say. It is not unusual for people under emotional strain or the
influence of alcohol to express hateful thoughts that they do not believe
or that are not indicative of their better feelings.'
38
In addition, people are afraid that things they say will be taken out
of context or misinterpreted. 139 Perhaps one can justify regulations of
hate speech because they force people to be more sensitive to their audi-
ence and exercise restraint before spewing venom or drivel. However,
imposing such discipline on people reduces their control over their own
lives. People do not like having every utterance subject to government
assessment, or having to fear that their words might cost them jobs,
friends and social standing. Thus, it is likely that some people reject
restrictions on hate speech because such restrictions make it difficult to
engage in activities that contribute to the pursuit of particular
interests.' 40
People also reject restrictions on hate speech for fear that their pur-
suit of particular interests will suffer, because these restrictions favor
interests that oppose their own. People criticize campus regulations
attacking hate speech, because they consider these regulations an aspect
of a larger movement to stifle speech critical of an agenda favored by
136. See HENTOFF, supra note 90, at 154.
137. See generally THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 87, at 3-112.
138. I think it is possible to express-and have-prejudicial thoughts, yet know they are
wrong. It is unfortunate, but a well-developed vocabulary of hatred exists to assist people in
conceptualizing the anger they feel toward others. While this anger is a primary characteristic of
bigoted people, for many others, it is an anomaly. Nonetheless, when pushed to anger in rare-or,
depending on the person, comparatively rare-situations that do not lend themselves to ready
deliberation, people will employ this vocabulary, even those who are repulsed by it.
139. See HENTOFF, supra note 90, at 154-58.
140. The consequences of having one's words misinterpreted can be severe. For example,
consider the recent controversy at Rutgers University. The President of the University, Francis
Lawrence, found himself in trouble concerning remarks he made about school admissions.
President Lawrence was arguing against admissions criteria that tended to harm minority
candidates-he also had a strong record on minority admissions-but the record of the minutes of
the meeting were garbled. They indicated that President Lawrence believed that minorities were
genetically ill equipped to do well on the exams. The controversy led to calls for his resignation.
See Jon Nordheimer, Rutgers Leader Disavows Linking Race and Ability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1985, at B5.
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the left. These critics believe that restrictions on hate speech shield an
ideal-of a society characterized by diversity and equality-that minori-
ties, feminists, and homosexuals seek to advance. 1 ' They fear that lim-
its on speech will prevent those who reject leftist ideology from
examining and exposing differences among people. 142 For example, cer-
tain restrictions against hate speech could be interpreted to proscribe
statements by people criticizing or condemning homosexuality, gender
equality or distinguishing characteristics of different races. This poten-
tial censorship would deny the affected speakers an opportunity to
explore controversial ideas about how they might live their lives, or it
would facilitate public acceptance-and consequently the pursuit by
others-of ideas that conflict with their particular interests. 4
3
A fear of government unduly burdening citizens' definition and
pursuit of particular interests informs the majority opinion in R.A. V.v.
City of St. Paul.'4" Justice Scalia assumed that the government has
authority to proscribe all speech encompassed by the category fighting
words.'45 But, he held that the government cannot ban some fighting
words without banning all fighting words.' 4 6 Scalia contends that the
government could skew people's assessments of societal conflicts if it
allowed one side to employ fighting words but not the other; "St. Paul
has no such authority to license one side to fight freestyle, while requir-
ing the other to follow the Marquis of Queensbury rules."' 4 7 Scalia's
response assumes that, although fighting words may be without value,
government restrictions could bias public discourse. 48 He suggests that
the Minneapolis statute would favor religious groups, given that it bans
attacks that express religious bigotry but allows people to use fighting
words to attack religious bigots. 49  When the political community
allows only certain groups to employ fighting words to gain public sup-
port for their particular interests, it burdens groups with conflicting
interests.
Justice Stevens challenges Scalia's claim that the Minnesota statute
favors certain viewpoints over others. 50 He contends that, even assum-
141. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHING TO GOMORRAH 262-63 (1996); DINESH D'SouzA,
ILLIBERAL EDUCATION 144-52 (1991); SANDMANN, supra note 129, at 150, 168.
142. See HENTOFF, supra note 90, at 178-79.
143. See id. at 152-53.
144. 505 U.S. 377 (holding that a law banning specific forms of hate speech-such as cross-
burning-was a content-based restriction, and therefore was unconstitutional).
145. See id. at 383.
146. See id. at 391.
147. Id. at 392.
148. See id. at 391-92.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 433-35 (Stevens, J., concurring).
[Vol. 52:733
1998] FREE SPEECH AND LIBERAL VIRTUES
ing the speech in Scalia's example constituted fighting words, there is a
difference between speech debating the need for tolerance and speech
debating the merits of competing religions. 5' Regardless of their view-
points, people remain free to employ fighting words in their discussions
of tolerance, but must refrain from using them in their discussions of
religions. 15
Stevens also claims that the government has an interest in protect-
ing the victims of hate speech. 53 By examining powerful arguments
that support his claim, one discovers that proponents of restrictions on
hate speech also seek to secure particular interests. Critical race theo-
rists defend the constitutionality of various restrictions on hate
speech."5 4 They believe that victims of hate speech curtail their partici-
pation within the political community, and are thereby denied interests
that a legitimate government must protect.
These theorists believe that hate speech inflicts substantial injuries
on its immediate victims. It also reinforces a climate that harms mem-
bers of the subordinate social groups that are its target; 15 it impedes
their ability to define and pursue particular interests. Hate speech is
hurtful. Critical race theorists contend that victims of hate speech have
suffered physical symptoms, psychological disorders and have even
become suicidal."5 6 They note that the immediate response to hate
151. See id. at 434-35 (Stevens, J., concurring).
152. See id. at 435 (Stevens, J., concurring). It should be noted that Stevens' rebuttal does not
respond to Scalia's contention that the regulation will bias public discussion. Although the
regulation may be neutral among people within the protected categories-it is neutral concerning
hate speech directed at men and women or Catholics and Protestants-it does limit our vocabulary
for making criticisms based on race, creed, religion, and gender. In contrast, it does not encumber
the expression of those who attack bigots.
153. See id. at 424-36 (Stevens, J., concurring).
154. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Charles R. Lawrence, III,
If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431; Mari
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320 (1989).
155. See Delgado, supra note 154, at 135; Lawrence, supra note 154, at 453-56.
Notwithstanding the documentation offered in support of these claims of harm, the discussion that
supports them-in the various articles-is somewhat anecdotal and speculative. Although it is
easy to recognize that harms are suffered, it is more difficult to quantify and, at times, qualify
them. Yet, it is important to appreciate the comments of Matsuda, supra note 154, at 2326-27,
and Lawrence, supra note 154, at 475-76, that minorities are much more likely to recognize the
harms and to be receptive to arguments in favor of regulation. I believe that the critical race
theorists make a case that supports narrow restrictions on hate speech. See infra text
accompanying notes 162-70. However, instead of debating the weight of competing ideals of
freedom and equality, our response to hate speech should focus on how to promote a community
in which citizens recognize and condemn the viciousness of those who employ it.
156. See Delgado, supra note 154, at 136-38, 143, 146; Lawrence, supra note 154, at 463;
Matsuda, supra note 154, at 2336.
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speech is often paralysis. Paralysis results both from the aggressive
nature of the expressed sentiment, and the fact that people tend to
employ hate speech when the victim's minority status is both clear and
relevant. 157
Critical race theorists claim that hate speech not only causes the
emotional distress of an ordinary insult, but also assaults its victim's
dignity by reinforcing social stigma.'58 The reinforcement of social
stigma leads members of subordinate social groups that are the victims
of hate speech-as well as the greater community-to question their
moral worth and place in society, and ultimately to curb their participa-
tion within the political community. 5 9 According to this view, the
statements themselves emphasize victims' lesser status to a point in
which it influences all of their interactions with superordinate groups. 6 '
Not only do they curb their participation within the political community,
they accept the majorities' assertions of superiority. Critical race theo-
rists argue that victims respond to this subordinate status by curtailing
their ambitions, and by failing to develop capabilities that would expand
their opportunities to pursue particular interests. 6 '
2. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AS A RESPONSE TO RESTRICTIONS ON
HATE SPEECH
a. Hate Speech and Political Legitimacy
It remains to be determined whether judges would have strength-
ened citizens' character if they had refused to invalidate legislation
restricting hate speech. But first, one must establish that properly drawn
restrictions on hate speech do not unduly burden collective and particu-
lar interests that a legitimate democratic government must protect. This
essay does not intend to offer a legislative proposal or defend an existing
statute. Yet, one must recognize that a vague or overbroad provision
will provide an incentive for self-censorship, and would allow too much
discretion to government officials charged with its enforcement. Offi-
cials with such discretion could skew public debate by targeting speech
they reject or that is critical of their performance. These problems
undermine collective and particular interests that a legitimate govern-
ment must secure.
A sufficiently narrow restriction on hate speech will address these
problems. It should describe the nature of the restricted speech and
157. See Lawrence, supra note 154, at 452.
158. See id. at 453-57.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See Delgado, supra note 154, at 136-38; Matsuda, supra note 154, at 2338-41.
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identify the specific harms it means to counteract. For example, a stat-
ute could restrict speech that is directed at certain groups, 62 and by
which the speaker primarily intends to vilify, humiliate, subordinate or
incite hatred against members of such groups. 163 The restriction should
account for the perspectives of both the speaker and audience members
whom it seeks to protect: In order to restrict hate speech, a judge must
believe that the speaker intended the message as an attack on some
members of his audience, and those members must interpret the speech
as an attack. The restriction should not encompass attacks that arise in
situations so heated that an average person would not consider the use of
hate speech premeditated. 164 In addition, speakers should not be liable
for hate speech when they are not aware of their victims' presence or
when their victims are present but the speaker addresses the audience as
a whole, not the victims directly. 161 But, once a judge determines that
an attack was intended, she should assess its ferocity-whether the
speaker employed hate speech-from the perspective of the victim.
166
Although a speaker will not be subject to prosecution unless he
directs hate speech at his victims, the proscription can encompass more
162. Statutes that restrict hate speech tend to define these groups based on race, ethnicity,
religion, gender, and sexual orientation. I recognize, however, that hate speech might not cause
the same harms to each group or might harm other groups in a manner that suggests the utility of a
broader definition. I do not address these questions in this essay.
163. Statutes that restrict hate speech should provide specific examples of the type of speech
contemplated, to provide guidance to officials who must decide whether a form of expression is
meant to promote these harms. Speaker intent is an important means for limiting the breadth of
the restriction. Without this limitation, it is likely that enforcing restrictions on hate speech would
unduly burden particular and collective interests that a legitimate government must protect.
However, we must also note that this claim becomes weaker as the evidence of the harms inflicted
by hate speech becomes stronger. See supra note 155. The critical race theorists allege serious
harms from which a legitimate government would have to shield its citizens. Not only would the
interest in protecting citizens from these harms override the costs of the restriction on speech, we
would also have better means to control the officials who enforce the restriction. The evidence
that would support the claims of the critical race theorists would, by its nature, provide
information about the types of speech that should fall within the restriction.
164. See GREENAWALT, supra note 102, at 49. Greenawalt notes that spontaneous speech of
this type might have expressive value. I do not think, however, that a government would
undermine its legitimacy if it demanded greater responsibility from all speakers by punishing such
utterances. But, I believe that broadening the restriction would provide officials too much
discretion to prosecute.
165. According to this view, we would consider a speaker at a Ku Klux Klan rally subject to
prosecution if he directs hate speech at African-Americans who protest the gathering. We would
not consider the same speech sanctionable if it was a commentary about African-Americans aimed
at the participants at the rally, even if the speaker knew that the protesters were present. I do not,
however, find any significant difference between the two situations. I draw the distinction only to
further limit the chances that prosecutors will abuse their discretion.
166. See GREENAWALT, supra note 102, at 51-52. Given that the restriction is intended to limit
harm to victims, it is how they experience the attack that is relevant.
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than face-to-face attacks. 167 If the political community intends to limit
the harms of hate speech, it has reason to extend protection to victims
who are not in the speaker's presence. The harms it seeks to prevent
would also arise from a speaker sending a letter to someone or burning a
cross in front of their home when they are not immediately in the
speaker's presence or when they happen to be away. Similarly, the
political community might protect people from direct attacks that dispar-
age groups to which they belong; speakers can attack members of their
audience without singling them out.
168
When the political community enforces broader restrictions on hate
speech, however, it gives prosecutors the discretion to determine
whether an attack is direct, and risks the possibility of people censoring
themselves. This should give us reason to pause, especially considering
the likelihood that attacks against victims will be combined with speech
that can contribute to citizens' deliberations about collective and particu-
lar interests.
We can defend this discretion. The discretion to determine whether
someone was attacked directly is analogous to the discretion to deter-
mine whether an attack was face-to-face-discretion that those who
defend restrictions on fighting words tolerate. 169 The different proximi-
ties of the attacks might make it harder for an official to decide that an
attack was direct-and thus, make an abuse of discretion harder to
detect. But, one addresses this problem by significantly narrowing the
type of speech that is subject to prosecution. Prosecutions will remain
rare, and those that do occur will garner enough attention to clarify the
standard of actionable speech. Furthermore, the defenders of free
speech will provide valuable support to those who wish to flaunt the
restriction. If anything, they might have an incentive to overcome the
impulse to self-censorship, knowing that their trial will expand their
audience and that their legal defense will be subsidized.
More significantly, the problems of discretion and self-censorship
involve questions of how to administer restrictions on speech that can be
justified in theory. If experience suggests that narrow restrictions do not
sufficiently control discretion and provide too great an incentive for self-
censorship, we can adjust our response to hate speech in order to secure
the goals underlying our conception of how free speech contributes to
167. But cf GREENAWALT, supra note 102, at 62-64.
168. 1 do not mean to take a position on the concept of group libel, except to not reject it
categorically. I suspect that group libels cause many of the harms as hate speech, but they are not
necessarily aimed at individuals. Here, I only seek to protect individuals when a speaker intends
to harm them through a group libel.
169. See R.A.V., 392 U.S. at 399-403 (White, J., concurring); 424-26 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See also GREENAWALT, supra note 102, at 53.
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political legitimacy. 170
It is possible, however, that even a narrow restriction limiting hate
speech will harm citizens' collective and particular interests. Therefore,
one must strengthen the theoretical case by examining four arguments
challenging the legitimacy of a government that enforces even narrow
restrictions on hate speech: (1) Protecting hate speech benefits speakers
whose definition and pursuit of a particular interest requires the use of
hate speech; (2) Protecting hate speech will lead those who employ it to
reformulate their ends and make, what they consider to be, better
choices concerning particular interests; (3) Protecting hate speech will
advance citizens' deliberations concerning the definition and pursuit of
particular interests; 7 ' and (4) Protecting hate speech advances a collec-
tive interest in defining community values.
The first two claims involve benefits to speakers who employ hate
speech; hate speech contributes to their definition and pursuit of particu-
lar ends, and it invites discussion that could help them to reformulate
their ends. One can reject the first claim, because restrictions on hate
speech will not have a significant impact on the ends people can pursue.
People can continue to define and pursue most ends, even when denied
the privilege of employing hate speech. Some might respond that hate
speech is essential to the pursuit of certain ends, and they are probably
correct. For example, it is easy to imagine forms of white supremacy
that people could not pursue without the ability to employ racist and
anti-semitic epithets.' 72
One can defend the legitimacy of a government that restricts such
speech. A legitimate government must give citizens considerable rein to
pursue particular interests and especially to engage in discourse that
facilitates their pursuits. But, political legitimacy should be assessed
based on the general environment that results from the government's
exercise of power. The government can restrict speech when it estab-
lishes a close correspondence between a form of speech and a substan-
tial harm. 173  One tolerates such restrictions because these harms
170. See infra text accompanying notes 232-42.
171. This claim of course has two bases: (1) citizens will make better choices; and (2) citizens'
choices will be more autonomous. See supra text accompanying note 30.
172. It is important to emphasize that the government does not interfere with citizens' choice
of these ends, except to the extent that people will be less likely to choose ends that are difficult to
pursue. This might be a violation of their autonomy, and an instance of governmental coercion.
Nonetheless, even if hate speech is restricted, people can continue to believe in any form of white
supremacy and will continue to be exposed to such ideas as well as people who pursue analogous
ideas. More importantly, it is obvious that political legitimacy does not depend on the government
treating people as autonomous beings by allowing them to pursue any end they happen to choose.
We tolerate government coercion so long as it has sufficient reasons to support its actions.
173. See R.A.V., 392 U.S. at 416-26 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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threaten particular interests that a legitimate government must protect.
Thus, the government can draw on the critical race theorists' argument
that hate speech limits citizens' ability to define and pursue particular
interests to justify restrictions on hate speech.
It is possible that the government might have alternative means for
securing these interests. But, given the narrowness of the restriction on
the speaker,' 74 the government's action would still not scuttle its legiti-
macy. Although certain speakers might rightfully consider themselves
coerced by a government that forecloses the pursuit of certain ends,75
the government should be considered legitimate, so long as it continues
to maintain an environment that provides sufficient conditions for citi-
zens to define and pursue particular interests.
176
One can reject the second claim for many of the same reasons: The
particular interests of the victims of hate speech provide a basis for gov-
ernmental action that outweighs speakers' interest in how hate speech
contributes to their choice of particular interests, 177 and one should not
determine political legitimacy based on how the government's exercise
of authority affects a small number of people. In addition, given the
nature of hate speech, one would not expect that it would advance
speakers' deliberations about particular interests by inviting discussion
that could help them to reformulate their ends. People who use hate
speech indicate that they do not expect and will not engage any
response. In most contexts, their expectations will be satisfied; hate
speech precludes rational reply.
17
174. It is possible that it would affect the wider population to such an extent that government
legitimacy would be undermined. I address this claim infra.
175. Similarly, the speaker would rightfully consider himself coerced even if the government
had to restrict his speech in order to ensure other citizens sufficient opportunity to define and
pursue their particular interests. In each case, the question of the scope of freedom guaranteed by
a legitimate government and how individual citizens experience the exercise of that authority are
distinct-though obviously related-questions.
176. This suggests that the argument of legitimacy turns on the third claim that will be
examined.
177. I do consider this interest more important than the benefit citizens derive because
guarantees of free speech facilitate their pursuit of particular interests that undermine important
interests of others. But, I do not believe that a government derives its legitimacy by promoting an
environment in which some citizens' deliberations about particular interests are advanced at the
expense of other citizens' deliberations.
178. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. One could argue that hate speech promotes
discussions with other bigots, and this would contribute to the speaker's formulation of his ends.
However, this possibility is addressed by our response to the first claim. It is also possible that
through hateful expression, the speaker might attract the efforts of people who could help him to
moderate his prejudice. We can reject this argument-as a claim of the second type-because of
my response to such claims. However, it also seems relevant to an analysis of claims of the third
type; we can improve the conditions in which citizens define and pursue particular interests if we
could significantly reduce the number of people prone to employ hate speech. I do not examine
this claim, however, because the contingency on which it is premised appears remote as does the
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The disutility of hate speech in generating discussion also under-
mines the third claim, that protecting hate speech would advance citi-
zens' deliberations concerning particular interests. Some people argue
that exposure to hate speech might lead some citizens to reexamine their
own prejudices and might promote discussion within the political com-
munity that would lead citizens to make better and more autonomous
choices about their particular interests. For example, Bollinger argues
that when forced to confront hate speech, citizens would also have to
confront their own sublimated prejudices.179 It is likely that such a self-
examination would lead people to reevaluate their particular interests.
We have already seen, however, that the extremity of hate speech is not
likely to force people to confront their prejudices; it is more likely to
give citizens reason to confirm the presuppositions that govern their
lives.' 8° Joseph Raz also contends that by protecting speech of little
value-what he calls bad speech" 8'-the political community advances
citizens' definition and pursuit of particular interests. Rather than find
value with extreme forms of speech, he claims that such speech is an
aspect of worthy-though imperfect-forms of life. 82 Raz believes
that when the government restricts speech, it condemns forms of life
associated with that speech, and it becomes more difficult for those lives
to "gain public recognition and acceptability."' 83 Thus, the govern-
ment's actions limit citizens' ability to identify and pursue worthwhile
forms of life.
Raz does not address important questions relevant to this essay,
including whether one can justify restrictions on hate speech;' 84 he only
seeks to support the claim that free speech is a public good. 85 But
Raz's argument seems to confound the criticism that hate speech is ill-
suited to advance citizens' deliberations about particular interests.
86
The political community would have reason to protect even worthless
possibility that the cumulative effect of such transformations will lead to significant benefits for
the general citizenry. Moreover, if these assumptions are incorrect, my response to claim three
would apply to this argument as well.
179. See BOLLINGER, supra note 35, at 92-92, 105-08.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
181. See Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, II OXFORD J. LEG. ST.
303, 316 (1991).
182. See id.
183. See id. at 318.
184. Raz does not address the application of other arguments defending free speech or the
types of harms that would justify limitations on free speech. Moreover, his essay does not
distinguish among varieties of "bad speech." As I will argue, the problem of separating speech
from associated life-styles becomes less pressing as the speech in question becomes more
extreme-such as the speech contemplated by the restrictions I examine.
185. See Raz, supra note 181, at 305.
186. See supra text accompanying note 178.
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speech, if its restriction would impede people's ability to identify and
pursue valuable forms of life. 1
87
Raz's argument can be surmounted. He justifies protection for
speech that is "an expression or portrayal of something which is a part of
a valuable way of life."' 8  The challenge Raz presents is whether one
can separate hate speech from valuable forms of life with which it can
be associated. If successful, the restriction on hate speech will not deter
people from pursuing valuable forms of life, and it might increase the
appeal of such lives. Consider three examples: (1) a black nationalist
employing anti-semitic hate speech; (2) a Catholic employing hate
speech to condemn homosexuality; and (3) members of a fraternity
directing abusive language at a female student in a public space. Even
assuming that in each case the speech contributes to a worthwhile form a
life,'8 9 it seems likely that the separability problem will diminish as the
speech at issue becomes more extreme; even though hate speech might
be related to expression associated with a valuable form of life, the
speaker attenuates the association by employing hate speech.' 9 °
One can, therefore, condemn individuals who employ hate speech
to attack Jews, gays, and women, and not condemn the groups to which
they belong, even if those groups espouse anti-semitic, homophobic or
sexist ideas. People derive the association between speech and a form of
life from either the substantive message of the speech or the act of
expression itself: On the one hand, a Catholic communicates a tenet of
theology by condemning the sinfulness of homosexual acts; on the other
hand, fraternity members flirt obnoxiously with women as part of a rit-
ual designed to strengthen group bonds. But, each use of speech is only
a single component in a complex form of life. One would expect that
such speech would affect how people comprehend these lives, but that
the use of hate speech would draw attention to the speaker and away
from any message concerning the form of life he espouses.
In the case of the Catholic condemning homosexual acts, the bitter-
ness of the hate speech would overwhelm and undermine its substantive
message. The speech loses any connection to Catholic theology or what
one would consider a Catholic form of life. People distinguish between
a homophobe who happens to be Catholic from a Catholic who con-
187. Raz's concern that the government not condemn forms of life extends to people whose
lives are censored. They might suffer injuries that could undermine a government's claim of
legitimacy. My earlier arguments address this claim. See supra text accompanying notes 172-78.
188. Raz, supra note 18 1, at 319.
189. See id. Raz does not resolve the question of what makes a form of life unacceptable.
190. The problem of extreme speech will also bear on the harm that we can counterbalance
against citizens' interest in free speech. But, my only concern is whether the separability problem
diminishes as speech becomes less rational.
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demns homosexuality based on religious grounds. 9 ' Similarly, the fra-
ternity members' expression loses its significance when it takes the form
of hate speech. Although many fraternities engage in-what outsiders
might consider-extreme forms of behavior in order to solidify bonds
among members, they do not consider hurting women an aspect of their
life.192 In each case, one would expect that proponents of these lives
would endorse action to prevent misrepresentation of how they experi-
ence or understand their lives.
Raz might respond that our greater concern should be how outsid-
ers perceive those lives, and that when the government condemns propo-
nents of those lives who employ hate speech, it condemns the lives
themselves. Yet, if the goal is to avoid government actions that render
these lives less attractive, one should take seriously the concerns of pro-
ponents who do not want people's perception of these lives to be
clouded by a false association with hate speech. In the absence of gov-
ernmental restrictions, people who associate a form of life with hate
speech, perceive a stereotype of that life; they see Catholicism as
homophobia or fraternity life as sexism. By preventing such false
associations, restrictions on hate speech could advance Raz's goal of
enhancing people's opportunity to experience valuable forms of life, as
well as the aims of people who pursue lives that people falsely associate
with hate speech.193
This response to Raz does not address his concern for the close
association between bad speech and valuable forms of life. Instead, it
severs hate speech from these forms of life by denying the association
that is a presupposition of Raz's argument. Yet, significant problems
remain concerning (1) how to draw the line between hate speech and bad
speech that many proponents of a form of life would consider an aspect
of their life, and (2) how to treat bad speech that is not hate speech. For
example, black nationalists have an interest in severing their move-
191. Even people who condemn the Catholic Church as homophobic should accept this
distinction. Gay rights activists direct energy toward the Catholic Church because it poses a
greater threat than ordinary homophobes who do not root their opposition to homosexuality in a
conception of a well-lived life.
192. They certainly do not present themselves as misogynist associations. It may be possible
that there are fraternities in which each member has misogynistic attitudes, and views the
fraternity as a means to advance these attitudes. But, this seems unlikely. However, it is certainly
true that some fraternities harm women, and some members of fraternities seek to harm women.
193. It is possible that those who employ hate speech are defining a life that differs from the
life proponents defend, i.e., certain fraternity members define their life in terms of its misogyny.
But, one would expect that as hate speech becomes integral to someone's understanding of their
form of life, we can class that life as a bad one. Raz does not specify what makes a life a bad one,
but suggests that it is tied closely to actions that can be regulated by law. I do not plan to make
the argument, but I would expect that hate speech would be integral to lives that can be
condemned under this criterion.
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ment's association with anti-semitism. One often hears the complaint
that accusations of anti-semitism have prevented people from grasping
their project. However, many black nationalists continue to affirm the
ideas that underlie expression they consider unnecessarily extreme.
Many Jews, on the other hand, believe that these ideas are anti-semitic
and amount to hate speech. Our response to Raz only supports restric-
tions which encompass the comparatively insignificant area in which
most black nationalists acknowledge that the restricted expression is
hate speech. 94 Therefore, one must determine whether there are reasons
to override Raz's argument, and to extend the concept of hate speech to
include expression that is more closely associated with valuable forms of
life. 195
The political community can restrict hate speech and still provide
citizens significant opportunities to explore various worthwhile forms of
life. A legitimate government must respect citizens' autonomy by
allowing citizens to gauge their own interests. In addition, it must also
provide an environment in which citizens have adequate information for
defining particular interests and choosing the means to pursue them.' 9 6
If the government can sustain such an environment without protect-
ing hate speech, it has no obligation to pursue a superior environment.
Assuming that people have adequate information relevant to the choices
they have to make and opportunity to deliberate about those choices, it
would be strange to insist that a government must continue to advance
people's interest in the conditions in which they select their ends without
regard for other interests, especially their interest in pursuing the ends
they choose. For example, citizens' interest in the conditions in which
they deliberate about particular interests justifies a law that prevents a
194. We would also expect that people who engage in a common form of life would be slow to
consider the speech of a fellow member-espousing ideas that they look upon favorably-a form
of hate speech.
195. Again, these considerations do not refute Raz's argument. Raz does not argue that
governments derive legitimacy through free speech guarantees that advance citizens' deliberations
about particular interests. In addition, he did not examine other interests, including free speech
interests, that would override the considerations that lead us to treat free speech as a public good.
See supra note 184.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30. I need not get into what an appropriate limit
is, given that I do not believe the interference is at all significant. For the vast majority of people,
narrow restrictions on hate speech have little influence on this process. Clearly, at one level, the
government does not respect the autonomy of speakers whose use of hate speech is proscribed.
This is why we can say that the government acts coercively against such speakers whether or not
we can justify the action. See supra note 175. But we have also seen that governmental
legitimacy depends on the general environment created by the government's exercise of authority,
not on how its exercise affects particular people. Although I believe that citizens have a greater
interest in being treated autonomously than they have in pursuing interests that require the use of
hate speech, I do not think that narrow regulations of hate speech impact this interest in a manner
that would threaten government legitimacy.
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religion from taking actions that permanently foreclose its members
opportunity to reassess their commitment to that religion.1 97 One would
still challenge a supplementary law that forces people to consider an
array of religious literature before they are free to practice any religion.
Therefore, even if restrictions on hate speech reduce the diversity
of lives that citizens have reasonable opportunity to choose, it is not
clear that a concern to advance citizens' deliberations about particular
interests should override a concern for the particular interests of the vic-
tims of hate speech.198 People who defend restrictions on hate speech
illustrate how these victims have less opportunity to define and pursue
particular interests.1 99 Given an environment in which citizens have sig-
nificant opportunity to define and pursue diverse forms of life, it would
be odd to sacrifice important interests of some citizens in order to foster
conditions that enhance these same interests for other citizens.
Furthermore, restrictions on hate speech might improve the envi-
ronment in which citizens define and pursue particular interests. 2 °
Although people would be less likely to pursue valuable forms of life
that are tainted by their association with hate speech, the restriction
against hate speech might assist proponents of those lives who seek to
sever the association. Black nationalists who reject anti-semitism will
have an incentive to forego incendiary speech and address their concern
that such speech impedes the growth of their movement. 20 ' These
actions might make it easier for people to consider that life.
Finally, one must consider whether the political community can
restrict hate speech without undermining its interest in identifying com-
munity values. Robert Post, for example, rejects critical race scholars'
arguments for restricting hate speech, because he believes that guaran-
tees of free speech promote self-government; 2°2 "[D]emocracy serves
the value of self-determination by establishing a communicative struc-
ture within which the varying perspectives of individuals can be recon-
ciled through reason."2 3  In a well-ordered democracy, political
197. See Kenneth Ward, The Allure and Danger of Community Values: A Criticism of Liberal
Republican Constitutional Theory, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 171, 209-14 (1996).
198. Moreover, I will argue that judges promote citizens' ability to define and pursue particular
interests by refusing to invalidate restrictions on hate speech.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 154-61.
200. See also infra text accompanying notes 227-48. I will argue that judges can strengthen
citizens' character by tolerating restrictions on hate speech. This argument, in contrast, contends
that tolerating the restriction will lead citizens to choose better ends and make better choices
concerning how to pursue them.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 194-95.
202. See PosT, supra note 135, at 299; Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the
First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 302 (1991).
203. PosT, supra note 135, at 303-04.
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discourse helps citizens synthesize collective and particular interests. It
leads citizens to freely reassess their public and private commitments.2 °4
Post contends that restrictions on hate speech impede legitimate
democratic government. He makes both types of claims 20 5 that root
political legitimacy in a collective interest in identifying community val-
ues. Restrictions on hate speech make it impossible for some citizens to
consider the exercise of government authority as consistent with their
will. The government must protect hate speech, according to Post, in
order to ensure that citizens are treated as free and equal;2 1 6 citizens
must remain free to challenge exercises of public authority from which
they dissent.2 07 As public discussion continues, citizens have opportu-
nity to reassess any policy the government implements. They can, there-
fore, acknowledge their participation in democratic government, even
when they dissent from any particular policy defined by elected institu-
tions. This view suggests that people can consider the exercise of gov-
ernment authority as consistent with their will.
20 8
Restrictions on hate speech also interfere with the conditions of
open discussion that allow us to treat a democratically defined norm as a
community value. Post believes that concepts such as race and gender
are inherently controversial, and that it is better to settle these meanings
through discourse rather than allow a dominant majority to impose
them. 0 9
Post, however, also recognizes that the process by which the polit-
ical community identifies its values is in tension with citizens' particular
interests. He identifies a conflict among the requirements of effective
political discourse. The norms of the diverse communities that consti-
tute the political community shape the identities, and thus, particular
interests of citizens who participate in public discourse. 10 Public dis-
course depends on these communities to articulate the competing inter-
ests that it integrates.2 1' Yet, public discourse must also remain
unfettered. This requirement creates conflicts with the norms of constit-
uent communities.
These conflicts form what Post calls the paradox of public dis-
course.2 12 In the absence of regulation, political discussion stalls,
204. See id. at 299.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
206. See POST, supra note 135, at 304.
207. See id. at 184-87.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 307-08.
210. See id. at 193-94.
211. See id. at 192.
212. See id. at 147-48, 192-94.
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because citizens must tolerate and comprehend speech that they find
offensive, irrational, or coercive. But, a legitimate government cannot
enforce the civility norms of particular communities. First, it must allow
people who reject these norms to continue to challenge them. Second, a
government that enforces the civility norms of particular communities
impedes the identification of community values, by excluding from pub-
lic discourse competing perspectives advocating unfamiliar and
marginalized forms of life.213
However, the paradox of public discourse makes it impossible to
support Post's argument for tolerating hate speech. He assumes that
open discussion gives citizens a sense that their particular interests are
being represented, which allows them to consider the exercise of polit-
ical authority consistent with their will. Ideally, open discussion allows
people to assess diverse views and identify those norms that every citi-
zen can integrate within his or her conception of particular interests.
One could, however, defend restrictions on hate speech as neces-
sary to ensure that citizens can freely integrate these interests. Post
identifies inevitable connections between public and private identity. He
cites Michelman's argument that political discourse transforms partici-
pants' identities.2" 4 Yet, Michelman defends a process in which the
transformation in participants' identities results from non-coercive polit-
ical discourse among equals.21 5 If one accepts the views of critical race
scholars, a political community that tolerates hate speech subjects its
victims to an environment that they experience as systematically degrad-
ing, demeaning, and oppressive.216 Such an environment would impede
their definition and pursuit of particular interests. According to this
view, Post's conception of public discourse sacrifices the particular
interests of victims of hate speech to the end of identifying community
values. 217 Thus, they could not consider the exercise of political author-
ity as consistent with their will.
Moreover, public discourse becomes less efficacious when the
political community tolerates hate speech that prevents particular com-
munities from shaping the perspectives of their members. Post believes
that public discourse integrates interests defined by particular communi-
ties, but he rejects restrictions on hate speech, because public discourse
also defines the identities of these groups. Yet, this idea-that the pub-
lic participates in the definition of particular communities-seems to
213. See id. at 188-89, 313.
214. See id. at 186.
215. See id. at 119. See also Michelman, supra note 39, at 15-27.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 155-61.
217. See POST, supra note 135, at 309-11.
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contradict what Post says about the requirements of political discourse.
He discusses the role particular communities play in constituting indi-
viduals' identities. He states that democratic government " . . . presup-
poses important (not to say foundational) aspects of the social world
organized along non-democratic lines. 21 8
Post describes how families and educational institutions socialize
individuals.2t 9 Yet, he fails to adequately discuss how ethnic or racial
communities shape people's identities. Because public discourse is in
tension with, as well as dependent upon, the civility norms of communi-
ties, Post must establish the point at which community values are
enforced, to ensure that particular communities can continue to develop
the individuals who introduce diverse perspectives that fuel political dis-
course. 22 ° Post shifts questions of the identity of these groups to the
public sphere, and does not address the burden that political discourse
imposes on the development of members of particular communities.22'
Post believes that public discourse itself is the best means to deter-
mine whether hate speech impedes public discourse. Otherwise, restric-
tions on hate speech will limit the scope of discussion, and thus, prevent
discourse from being transformative.2 However, Post's alternative of
enforcing civility norms only when dialogical breakdown is likely, begs
the question he seeks to address: What is the proper scope of discussion
in light of the paradox of public discourse?
223
Post fails to answer this question because he doubts whether the
diverse communities that constitute the larger political community can
resolve their disagreements. He does not think that there is a perspective
that allows one to objectively evaluate the operation of public dis-
course. 224 Even assuming that there is no objective point from which to
gauge public discourse, it seems strange to trust a potentially defective
process to correct itself, and then reject regulations of hate speech that
emerge as ameliorants.
218. Id. at 299.
219. See id. at 301.
220. See id.
221. One consequence of public discussion altering people's understanding of the communities
that participate in the constitution of citizens' identities is the danger of community members
being coerced into conforming with perceived public norms. Of course, this is a problem
associated with all public discussion of communities and not simply discussion that employs hate
speech. In addition, although it is more difficult for citizens to deny their racial origin than their
religious, ethnic or familial connections, it is possible to reject norms one has absorbed from a
community of race. Certainly, the evidence of black children internalizing their inferior public
status is disturbing-at least in part-because it indicates their rejection of their heritage. See
Delgado, supra note 154, at 147.
222. See POST, supra note 135, at 317.
223. See id. at 302.
224. See id. at 305-06, 317.
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Post, nonetheless, recognizes that the victims of hate speech bear
the weight of the requirement of unfettered public discourse.225 He sug-
gests affirmative action and anti-discrimination programs as possible
means to secure the position of victims of hate speech in the political
community.22 6 Our experience with these programs indicates, at best,
limited success in integrating people who feel excluded from the polit-
ical community. In addition, one would expect great difficulties in pass-
ing programs to combat the social and economic conditions that alienate
citizens from the political community. These difficulties are further
exacerbated by a political environment tolerant of hate speech. It would
be surprising if people who withdraw from political engagements were
to enjoy great success at protecting particular interests. Post cannot
employ a collective interest in identifying community values to support
his argument against restricting hate speech, if the harms from hate
speech undermine that interest.
b. Judicial Restraint as a Means to Strengthen Citizens' Commitment
to the Political Community
Frankfurter's defense of judicial restraint suggests an alternative
means to transcend the paradox of public discourse; by refusing to inval-
idate restrictions on hate speech, judges might promote conditions in
which citizens will recognize how free speech contributes to the devel-
opment of their character. The conflicts generated by legislation
restricting hate speech will not render racists open-minded, homophobes
tolerant, or sexists liberated. But, there is reason to believe that the
Court's defense of free speech in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul has pre-
empted a debate that could have strengthened the character of some citi-
zens, and could have led them to this recognition. It is interesting to
note the passing of the debate about speech codes on campus. These
debates, which had forced people to respond to arguments that chal-
lenged the value of free speech, have been muted in the aftermath of the
Court's decision.227 One can also make a Thayerite observation con-
cerning how the Court influenced the debate: Many participants
employed the language of the Court's First Amendment jurispru-
dence,228 and some suggested that university officials-facing political
pressure to respond to racist incidents on campus-could rely on the
Court to correct unconstitutional aspects of their policies. 2 9
225. See id. at 293.
226. See id. at 321.
227. See supra note 126.
228. See supra notes 129-32.
229. See Sandmann, supra note 129, at 88, 123, 158-59, 163.
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How would extending political debates about speech codes and
hate speech influence people's perceptions about free speech and the
value of a liberal character? Judicial restraint in response to restrictions
on hate speech would encourage defenders of free speech to identify
arguments that establish the value of unrestricted expression, and would
promote empathy among citizens that would lead some people to com-
prehend how free speech contributes to the development of their
character.
The defenders of free speech will have an incentive to employ
arguments appealing to interests that transcend citizens' particular inter-
ests. They face two problems. To repeal recently enacted legislation,
they must force some legislators to concede a mistake, something that
legislators are loath to do.23° In addition, people who supported the
original restriction will defend their success. They would express anger
at a system of free speech that continues to impose great harms on the
victims of hate speech. It would be difficult for legislators seeking
repeal to explain why some citizens should endure harms that limit their
definition and pursuit of particular interests so that other citizens can
enjoy these same interests.
More significantly, considering the sacrifice the political commu-
nity demands of the victims of hate speech, the defenders of free speech
would have to advance arguments that appeal beyond citizens' concern
for particular interests. They would have to convince these victims to
tolerate vicious attacks-knowing that the system of free speech will
counter the hate speech-and persevere in their own efforts to define
and pursue particular interests. The defenders of free speech would have
an incentive to follow a model such as Brandeis' Whitney concurrence,
and convince citizens that the development of their character depends on
a system of unimpeded public discourse.
In addition, by tolerating restrictions on hate speech, judges afford
people an opportunity to observe how officials exercise their discretion
to enforce these restrictions. Such information is highly relevant to an
understanding of free speech. People routinely defend broad guarantees
of free speech by invoking the specter of a government abusing its dis-
230. This argument presupposes that there has not been a significant alteration in the
composition of the legislature-of course, depending on the original vote, a significant alteration
could be a change of one new legislator. It also depends on a related presupposition: that citizens'
positions have not changed significantly. For example, people whose support of free speech is
tied to its effect on particular interests might have made organizational strides that would allow
them to place great pressure on legislators. However, I believe that it is unlikely that such a shift
would be significant, considering that particular interests are at stake on both sides of the issue.
Given the original success of the proponents for restricting hate speech, we would expect the other
side to be well organized.
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cretion to define and punish harmful speech. Although this suspicion
might be supported by historical examples of governmental restrictions
on speech, 231 a historical understanding cannot substitute for the actual
experience of seeing a government exercise its authority. Given that
narrow restrictions on hate speech do not undermine political legiti-
macy,232 the political community can afford the risks required to attain
this valuable experience.
This experience might lead people to curtail the government's
authority to restrict speech. The experience of the campus speech codes
illustrates the difficulty of narrowing the application of a restriction on
hate speech. The language of a speech code will often lend itself to
circumstances different from the most serious incidents-usually of
racism, sexism or homophobia-that led to its adoption.233 As public
officials enforce the restriction, one can compare different incidents in
which they have to respond to the complaints of people offended by the
speech of others. After adoption of the University of Wisconsin speech
code, a student filed a complaint against an editorial cartoon considered
to be anti-Christian expression.234 At the University of Michigan, a stu-
dent brought a charge against another student for reciting a limerick that
the complainant considered demeaning to homosexuals. 235 We should
compare the expression in these cases, and also compare these cases to
others such as: (1) fraternities conducting slave auctions and dressing in
blackface; 236 (2) people hounding and abusing students with racist and
sexist epithets; 237 (3) fliers left on or under students' doors that attack
them based on their race; 238 (4) students being told that Asians-like
themselves-are ruining America;2 39 and (5) a physical attack on mem-
bers of a Jewish fraternity accompanied by anti-semitic and racist
statements.24 °
These cases can be distinguished based on the intensity of the hate
speech employed in each incident, as well as by the directness of the
attack on individuals. Yet, even assuming that the restriction of speech
is limited to cases of direct and intense harassment, administrators will
have considerable discretion to gauge directness and intensity. People
23 1. McCarthy era prosecutions of communists present obvious examples.
232. I am also assuming that people will apply a democratic tether to officials who abuse their
discretion.
233. See Sandmann, supra note 129, at 68-92, 107-38, 148-79.
234. See id. at 91.
235. See id. at 132.
236. See id. at 80-81.
237. See id. at 91.
238. See id. at 109.
239. See id. at 91.
240. See id. at 73-74.
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favoring and people opposing, restrictions on hate speech can assess the
exercise of discretion. This should influence their understandings of
free speech.24'
In addition, the enforcement of restrictions on hate speech provide
people an opportunity to gain insight into the experiences of others. One
often hears about how free speech provides information that allows peo-
ple to recognize danger in their midst.242 One also hears that free speech
expands people's access to different forms of life that can influence their
deliberations concerning collective and particular interests.243 But as
government institutions implement restrictions on offensive speech, peo-
ple will gain important information concerning their associates. Con-
flicts between the offensive and the offended confront speakers with the
costs of their words, and would encourage greater empathy among citi-
zens. Initially, these conflicts would allow some citizens to identify
vital particular interests that they share. Thus, they will be more likely
to subordinate other particular interests when they impede important
interests of others. Moreover, these conflicts also place pressure on peo-
ple to adapt their behavior in response to negative reactions of others.
Most people will initially consider this pressure coercive. They might
rethink their own perspective, however, as they attain greater under-
standing of perspectives that they have tended to neglect. Consequently,
they would also reassess their commitment to free speech, as they recog-
nize how it influences the development of their character.
Consider a prosecution of a black nationalist who spices a speech
with anti-semitic comments that violate a restriction on hate speech.
The prosecution could spawn curious political alliances among people
who consider government restrictions on speech as a threat to their defi-
nition and pursuit of particular interests. Many people will condemn the
prosecution, even though they reject the speaker's message-including
some victims of the attack-because of their concern that the govern-
ment threatens particular interests when it restricts speech. Moreover,
people who endorse the views of the speaker would attack the prosecu-
tion, because it poses a direct threat to particular interests.
241. It is difficult to believe that the biases of officials and the pressures created by the campus
environment will not influence their decisions. In Michigan, the officials conducted a hearing
and placed on probation the student who uttered the homophobic limerick. In Wisconsin, they did
not pursue the charge of anti-Christian speech. The two cases were different: people respond
differently to an editorial in a newspaper-where they expect to find controversial or offensive
statements-than they do to offensive statements made in their presence, especially if they have
reason to suspect that the offensive statement was directed at them. Nonetheless, we would
expect that officials would be slower to sanction speech against Christians compared to speech
against the people the speech codes were designed to protect.
242! See, e.g., Sandmann, supra note 129, at 164.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
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But, many of the people who support the speaker's views can also
empathize with victims of hate speech. The government would have to
justify its prosecution in a forum subject to unusually intense publicity.
Therefore, critics of the prosecution would have to confront the claims
of Jews who have been harmed by anti-semitic speech. They will claim
that hate speech impedes their pursuit of particular interests by reinforc-
ing a hostile social environment and a history of subordination. Black
nationalists might reject the analogy between the discrimination suffered
by Jews and African-Ameicans, but the experience of such a trial would
be unnerving. The claims of prejudice advanced by Jews would corre-
spond to their own experience. 2"
A limited form of empathy also guides the actions of Jews who,
notwithstanding the injury they suffer from anti-semitic speech and their
concerns about black nationalism, oppose the prosecution. They under-
stand the peril faced by the defendant; particular interests are threatened
when governments prosecute people because of ideas they espouse. We
have already seen this form of empathy in the statements made by peo-
ple defending the right of Nazis to march in Skokie. 4 5 As in that case,
however, it would be surprising if the recognition of a common interest
effectuated a greater change in character. Their predisposition against
black nationalism indicates that they will not seek an understanding of
the perspective of black nationalists. Consequently, they will not experi-
ence a shift in their own perspective, as free speech facilitates an
exchange of ideas with their opponents.246
The hypothetical prosecution might have an even greater influence
on Jews who favor guarantees of free speech, but are willing to tolerate
restrictions on hate speech that do not negatively impact their particular
interests. Although this group endorses the arrest of the black national-
ist, it is likely that some members will remain wary of government dis-
crimination against the defendant. The immediacy of the anti-semitic
attack could lead these members to conclude that black nationalists pose
a greater threat to their interests than a government that abuses its
244. In the four years that I worked in the City University of New York, I have noticed a shift
in response to how African-American students respond to allegations of anti-semitism. Although
they often remain skeptical of the claims of Jews, whom they regularly encounter in a position of
authority, they also seem more cautious in their dealings with Jews. They are sensitive to the
possibility that their comments could be construed as anti-semitic, and I believe this sensitivity is
partially attributable to a greater recognition of the similarity between anti-semitism and racial
prejudice. This recognition may have been induced by the debates that have occurred in the
aftermath of controversies involving Leonard Jeffries as well as supporters of Louis Farrakan.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
246. But their capacity for empathy suggests that they will be more receptive to the positions
of other citizens-including more moderate African-Americans who sympathize with the black
nationalist position-and that contact with these citizens might lead to greater empathy.
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power. Yet, their fear of majority tyranny will make them view the
prosecution with suspicion. As a trial unfolds, they will have reason to
empathize with the defendant's claim of majority persecution, and might
even conclude that the government has abused its authority. Once
removed from the tensions wrought by the incident of anti-semitic hate
speech, they would be in a position to rethink-and possibly regret-
their original response. They would move toward the position of those
who despise anti-semitic speech, but recognize a collective interest in
harnessing government power.
Although one would expect the prosecution of a black nationalist to
generate empathy between Jews and African-Americans, it would be
naive to think that this controversy would lead these groups to transcend
the prejudices that motivate the antipathies between their members. It
could have only a limited impact on the process by which members of
these groups define and pursue particular interests. Their mutual empa-
thy arises from each group's experience of majoritarian tyranny. It is
not a form of empathy that will cause either Jews or African-Americans
to seek an understanding of the particular interests of the other. Some
Jews might join black nationalists in combatting the prosecution or chal-
lenging the restriction on hate speech, and some African-Americans will
condemn the anti-semitic attack. It would be surprising, however, if
such alliances had a greater effect on the character of members of either
group. They would not fully recognize the value of a liberal character.
Nonetheless, changes in the political environment introduced by
restrictions on hate speech would also have repercussions that influence
the character of those not immediately involved in the conflict. Such
transformations could emerge gradually, as people are confronted by the
perspectives of others. The movement towards political correctness pro-
vides a useful analogy. Advocates of political correctness try to create
social pressure, so that speakers will have incentive to be vigilant in
anticipating the response to their speech. 247 Opponents of political cor-
rectness respond angrily to what they consider a form of censorship that
promotes an agenda they oppose. It is not unusual for opponents-or
even wary supporters of political correctness-to acknowledge the
claims of political correctness before flaunting one of its precepts.
Others undermine their conformity with a precept by apologizing for
their political correctness. When combatting another person's use of a
stereotype, they say things such as "I hate to be politically correct," or
247. This definition of political correctness is meant to identify common ground among
diverse and competing actions. I emphasize social pressure to distinguish legal mechanisms that
are the subject of this Section. But, the concept of social pressure is meant to convey responses
such as hissing, shunning, or ostracization.
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they employ ironic facial expressions to undercut their use of the femi-
nine pronoun in a context in which people expect the masculine.
Even though they express qualms about the coercive aspects of
political correctness, these people respond to its underlying claims.
They are more aware that people have sensitivities concerning language
and know that there are consequences when they ignore these sensitivi-
ties. Therefore, whether they like it or not, opponents of political cor-
rectness think harder about how others interpret their expression. One
would expect that their anger towards political correctness will correlate
with the extent that the demand for greater deliberation intrudes into
their thought processes.
The opponents of political correctness, however, derive benefits
from the intrusion and they can recognize these benefits. Political cor-
rectness forces speakers to be empathetic; they must take greater account
of how other people experience the world. Although many continue to
reject the claims of those promoting these interests, they still have to
confront unexpected interpretations of their speech and reconsider their
own political perspectives. They have become more cognizant of the
views of others. The businessman who restrains from telling an ethnic
joke in a public context may do so from fear of consequences, out of
respect to his audience or both. But, in each of these circumstances, his
restraint reveals an understanding of how others comprehend his state-
ments, and indicates that people adapt their pursuit of interests-if not
their definition of them-when confronted by the views of others.
Obviously, people who experience political correctness as coercive
might question the value of being sensitive to different perspectives.
Further consideration, however, will allow some people to distinguish
between how political correctness affects their pursuit of particular inter-
ests and how it affects their identification of these interests. In time, it is
probable that some people will internalize the requirements of political
correctness as they realize that their-and other people's-sensitivity to
these requirements have not curtailed their own pursuits. Moreover,
when they recognize the gap between the intended meaning of their
statements and the responses of their students, colleagues or friends,
they might come to appreciate the influence of political correctness.
This essay does not offer the analogy to political correctness either
as a defense of hate speech legislation or as a defense of political cor-
rectness. In both instances, restrictions on speech undercut the utility of
free expression as a means by which people define and pursue their par-
ticular interests. It seems likely that political correctness and restrictions
on hate speech lead people to engage in self-censorship and refrain from
introducing ideas that other people might find valuable. It would be
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preferable if we could trust that our responses to controversial opinions
and offensive statements would ensure that people would speak more
deliberately. 48
The analogy, however, suggests that political engagements influ-
ence how we think about our particular interests. Controversies involv-
ing both hate speech and political correctness might lead some people to
discover a deeper interest in free speech and reformulate their opposition
to such restrictions. They provide an incentive for the defenders of free
speech to present arguments linking robust guarantees of free speech to
the advancement of particular interests. The controversy involving hate
speech suggests that political engagements will generate empathy among
some citizens, enabling them to recognize the importance of extending
the application of free speech protection. Instead of viewing the restric-
tions on speech as an attack against particular interests, they may come
to view them as a threat to the system of open communication that is
integral to their formulation of these interests.
248. I do not reject all restrictions on hate speech. I believe that narrow restrictions can be
supported, based on an interest in protecting the victims of hate speech from some of the harms
they experience-harms that impede their ability to define and pursue particular interests. In
addition, when speech such as hate speech is so offensive that one cannot respond rationally, I
believe that actions such as shunning are appropriate.
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